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INTRODUCTION

In recognition of the social reality that marriage often does not last
forever, divorce law in the United States has undergone radical changes
in the past few decades.' All states have relaxed restrictions on divorce
by adopting some form of no-fault divorce grounds.2 In addition, recent
developments have facilitated the termination of a married couple's relationship in economic terms as well. For instance, states today are less
inclined to consider the role of marital fault in the settlement of the
financial incidents of divorce, 3 and encourage divorcing couples to end
their marriages by negotiation and contract in order to minimize the
conflicts inherent in litigation.4 Furthermore, although ensuring the
protection of dependent family members remains an important state
objective, contemporary family law promotes finality in the resolution
of financial obligations between a divorcing couple whenever practical
THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE (1972); M. GLENDON, THE NEW FAM(1981); L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION (1985); Weitzman,
Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1169 (1974).
2. In 1985 South Dakota became the last state to adopt a no-fault ground for divorce. See
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-4-2 (1984 & Supp. 1987). For a state-by-state breakdown of divorce
grounds, see 1985 Survey of American Family Law, 11 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 3015 (1985), and
Freed & Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 18 FAM. L.Q. 369, 379-83 (1985).
Following the leads of California, CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 4506, 4507 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987), and the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 9A U.L.A. 97, 147 (1987), both promulgated in 1970, approximately one-third of the states have replaced completely the traditional fault grounds with a single
no-fault ground. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-312 (1956 & Supp. 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. §
14-10-110 (1973 & Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.052 (West 1985 & Supp. 1987); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 552.6 (West 1967 & Supp. 1987). Other states have added a no-fault ground to existing fault grounds. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 401 (Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1987);
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208 & § 1-lB (Supp. 1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 201 (Purdon Supp.
1987); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.01-3.07 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1987). The Prefatory Note to the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 9A U.L.A. 147 (1987), noted that "there is virtual unanimity
as to the urgent need for basic reform," especially with regard to the fault-based ground, described
as "an unfortunate device which adds to the bitterness and hostility of divorce proceedings" and
which has established an "ineffective barrier" to marriage dissolution at the price of perjury and
disrespect for the law. Id. at 148.
3. See Freed & Walker, supra note 2, at 394-95 (outlining states' positions regarding the
relevance of marital fault as a factor in property division and maintenance awards); see also L.
GOLDEN, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY 255 (1983) (noting judicial reluctance to consider
marital fault in property division in absence of direct authorization).
4. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act attempts to "reduce the adversary trappings of
marital litigation" and to encourage parties "to make amicable settlements of their financial affairs." UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT prefatory note, 9A U.L.A. 147, 149 (1987).

1. See generally J. BERNARD,

ILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY
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by favoring property divisions and temporary spousal support awards
as opposed to permanent alimony.5 To the extent possible, then, current family law policy attempts to afford former spouses a fresh start by
promoting finality and peaceable resolution.
A fresh start following divorce cannot always be achieved, however.
In some cases continued support of a dependent spouse after divorce, as
well as support of the couple's minor children, necessarily entails an
indefinite or long-term series of payments. Property division also often
must be accomplished by a series of post-divorce installment payments
rather than an outright transfer of assets. Furthermore, a spouse may
have contracted or been ordered to assume liability for debts incurred
jointly during marriage. Starting a fresh, single life may be costly, and
maintaining two households instead of one obviously requires additional funds or a lower standard of living.7 Financial burdens following
divorce may prove to be more onerous than anticipated; consequently,
many recently divorced persons find themselves in bankruptcy court in
the wake of their marital breakup.8
Bankruptcy law, as well as modern divorce law, is grounded on
fresh start principles: an underlying policy of bankruptcy law is to provide the honest debtor an economic fresh start." Bankruptcy law
achieves this goal, in part, by permitting discharge of certain debts existing at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed. 10 Discharge of a debt
releases the debtor from further liability and bars the creditor from enforcement attempts."
5. See id. (describing property division "as the primary means of providing for the future
financial needs of the spouses"). Section 308 of the Act authorizes maintenance for a spouse only if

that spouse "(1) lacks sufficient property to provide for his reasonable needs; and (2) is unable to
support himself through appropriate employment or is the custodian of a child whose condition or
circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not be required to seek employment outside
the home." Id. at 348.
6. Property division must be accomplished by means of installment payments when insufficient liquid assets exist or the marital assets themselves are physically awarded to one spouse
alone. Typically, such assets include items such as the family home or an interest in an ongoing
business or professional corporation.
7. Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 269, 337 N.W.2d 332, 337 (1983) (indicating that "[t]he tablecloths. . . will not cover both tables"); see H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DoMEsTic
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 184 (1968).
8. A 1965 study revealed that one-third of the parties in bankruptcy proceedings had been
involved in a divorce within the previous year. Shiffer, The New Bankruptcy Reform Act: Its
Implications for Family Law Practitioners,19 J. FAM. L. 1, 3 (1980-81) (citing REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,

H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st

Sess., pt. I, at 42 (1973)). The financial strain that leads to bankruptcy may add to the deterioration of a marriage. Id.
9. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934); Williams v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549 (1915); Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904).
10. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1982 & Supp. IH 1985).
11. 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). For a thorough overview of a typical bankruptcy
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Countervailing policies, deemed superior to bankruptcy's fresh
start policy, demand that some types of debts escape discharge in bankruptcy 12 and that the debtor remain liable for those nondischargeable
obligations. Bankruptcy law long has regarded obligations for support
of certain family members, namely spouses' s and children, as one category of debts that should not be discharged.14 The current Bankruptcy
Code, 5 enacted in 1978, continues to acknowledge that certain divorcerelated debts should remain intact following a bankruptcy action. Secproceeding, see White, Strange Bedfellows: The Uneasy Alliance Between Bankruptcy and Family Law, 17 N.M.L. Rv. 1 (1987).
12. See 11 U.S.C.S. § 523(a) (Law. Coop. 1986 & Supp. 1987) (enumerating the debts that
are not dischargeable by an individual debtor in a Chapter 7, 11, or 13 bankruptcy).
13. The exception includes former spouses. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
The use of the term "spouse" in this Article refers to former spouses as well as current spouses.
14. 11 U.S.C.S. § 523(a)(5) (Law. Coop. 1986 & Supp. 1987) excepts from discharge debts:
to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support
of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree, or other
order of a court of record, determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a
governmental unit, or property settlement agreement, but not to the extent that(A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of law, or otherwise
(other than debts assigned pursuant to section 402(a)(26) of the Social Security Act, or any
such debt which has been assigned to the Federal Government or to a State or any political
subdivision of such State); or (B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or support, unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or
support.
See generally Freeburger & Bowles, What Divorce Court Giveth, Bankruptcy Court Taketh Away:
A Review of the Dischargeabilityof MaritalSupport Obligation, 24 J. FAM. L. 587 (1985-86); Hoffman & Murray, Obligations that Cannot Be Erased, 5 FAM. Anvoc., Winter 1983, at 18; Munson,
Discharge of Post-Marital Support Obligations Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 4 HARV.
WOMEN's L.J. 177 (1981); Ravin & Rosen, The Dischargeabilityin Bankruptcy of Alimony, Maintenance and Support Obligations, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1986); Shiffer, supra note 8; Staggs,
Bankruptcy After Divorce: Rights and Liabilities of FormerSpouses in Texas, 23 S. TEx. L.J. 173
(1982) (outlining Texas' classification of debts for dischargeability purposes); Swann, Dischargeability of Domestic Obligations in Bankruptcy, 43 TENN. L. Rav. 231 (1976) (providing a
detailed analysis of pre-Code case law); Tucker, The Treatment of Spousal and Support Obligations Under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 45 TEx. B.J. 1359 (1982); White, supra
note 11; Note, Dissolutionof Marriageand the Bankruptcy Act of 1973: "Fresh Start" Forgotten,
52 IND. L.J. 469 (1977) (discussing pre-Code law and projected effect of proposed 1973 amendments); Note, The Effect of the Indiana Divorce Law upon the Application of Section 17a(7) of
the Bankruptcy Act, 12 IND. L. REv. 379 (1979) [hereinafter Note, Indiana Divorce Law] (discussing pre-Code law, with emphasis on Indiana law); Note, Bankruptcy: Dischargeabilityof Divorce
Related Expenses Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5), 35 OKLA. L. REv. 799 (1982) [hereinafter Note,
Dischargeabilityof Divorce Related Expenses]; Comment, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978:
"Dischargeabilityof Obligations Incurred Under Property Settlements, Separation Agreements,
and Divorce Decrees, 12 U. BALT. L. REv. 520 (1983) [hereinafter Comment, Dischargeabilityof
Obligations].
The exception from discharge for support obligations applies regardless of the type of bankruptcy proceeding involved. In most cases, the exception is relevant not only in a Chapter 7 liquidation, 11 U.S.C. § 727(a), or a Chapter 13 wage earner plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2), but may be
applicable in a Chapter 11 reorganization as well. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(2).
15. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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tion 523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code excepts from discharge a debt:
to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for,
or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record, determination made in accordance
with State or territorial law by a governmental unit, or property settlement
agreement .... 11

To retain its nondischargeable character, the debt may not be assigned
to another party, except to certain governmental entities in connection
with public assistance programs. 17 Perhaps most importantly, the obligation must be "actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support"' in order to escape discharge, regardless of the language used to
describe the debt in the original instrument or decree.' 9 Thus, a person
who has been unable to achieve a complete fresh start through divorce
because of continuing financial obligations to family members may find
an economic fresh start in bankruptcy similarly thwarted.
In revising the earlier statutory exception to discharge for support
debts,20 Congress intended that federal law, not state law, should determine when an obligation is "actually in the nature" of alimony, maintenance, or support.2' A tremendous volume of litigation has been
generated under section 523(a)(5) largely because of the courts' failure
to develop a clear federal standard for determining the nature of these
debts. The major problem in formulating a federal standard has been
distinguishing support-related debts from those incurred pursuant to
property divisions. For, unlike a support obligation, an unpaid portion
of a property division is not included within the statutory exception
and is dischargeable as an ordinary debt.2 2 In an individual case, there16. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
17. 11 U.S.C.S. § 523(a)(5)(A) (Law. Coop. 1986 & Supp. 1987) denies discharge of certain
family related debts if they are assigned "involuntarily, by operation of law, or otherwise" to another entity "other than debts assigned pursuant to section 402(a)(26) of the Social Security Act,
or any such debt which has been assigned to the Federal Government or to a State or any political
subdivision of such State."
18. Id. (emphasis added).
19. Id.
20. Act of Feb. 5, 1903, Pub. L. No. 57-62, ch. 487, § 5, 32 Stat. 797, 798 (amending Bankruptey Act of 1898 ch. 541, § 17, 30 Stat. 544, 550 (repealed 1979)).
21. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 364, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6320; S.REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5865; see also In re Spong, 661 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981).
22. See Boyle v. Donovan, 724 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Maitlen, 658 F.2d 466 (7th Cir.
1981). When, however, the debtor holds specific property or the proceeds thereof, which were previously awarded to the spouse, the obligation to deliver or pay over is not dischargeable. In re
Dunlap, 15 Bankr. 737 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981). Courts may treat a failure to pay a spouse a lump
sum payment pursuant to a property division as an action for reclamation or relief from the stay,
rather than as a dischargeability issue. In re Underwood, 17 Bankr. 417, 419 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1981). Alternatively, courts may consider the failure as nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) (willful
or malicious injury to property). Id.Similarly, in In re Teichman, 774 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1985),
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fore, the precise classification of the obligation becomes critical.
Much of the lack of clarity and consistency in the cases attempting
to distinguish support obligations from payments made pursuant to
property divisions results from a failure to recognize the distinct theoretical foundations of the two concepts. Property division is a separation of ownership rights, legal or equitable,28 while support is a
continuation of the duty imposed by operation of law because of the
status of the parties as husband and wife or parent and child.2 ' The
failure on the part of many state courts to recognize as discrete doctrines the fundamental principles governing alimony, maintenance, and
support,2 5 on the one hand, and property division, on the other, often
has led to reclassification of debts when bankruptcy courts apply federal law. 26 Consequently, neither the debtor nor the obligee can rely entirely on the original decree or agreement.
Additional problems related to differentiating support-related
debts from property division debts occur because of the recent trend in
state courts to favor property division and new forms of short-term
spousal support awards over traditional permanent alimony whenever
the Ninth Circuit held that post-petition payments to the wife of the debtor's Air Force retirement
benefits were the wife's property and thus were not subject to discharge. The court found that
prepetition arrearages, concededly arising from a property division, were dischargeable and that
§ 523(a)(4) (nondischarge of debts for fraud or defalcation as a fiduciary) did not apply because
the court could discern no valid trust arrangement between the parties. Id.; accord In re Hall, 51
Bankr. 1002 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1985) (husband's military retirement pay awarded wife is wife's
property interest, not dischargeable debt); cf. In re Boyd, 31 Bankr. 591 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983)
(wife's lien on homestead pursuant to divorce decree constitutes her property interest in real estate, which is not avoidable by debtor), aff'd, 741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984).
23. H. CLARK, supra note 7, at 450.
24. Id. at 187-88. Because determining whether a debt is an obligation for child support is
usually relatively simple, see White, supra note 11, at 28, this Article focuses primarily on postdivorce spousal support. The Article addresses child support only as a reference to related
principles.
25. Although on occasion courts have purported to distinguish between alimony, maintenance, and support, see, e.g., In re Crist, 632 F.2d 1226, 1233 n.11 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub
nom. Crist v. Crist, 451 U.S. 986, 454 U.S. 819 (1981), the terms generally are used synonymously
with respect to a post-marital obligation to a former spouse. Alimony historically was a courtordered amount of money awarded to substitute for the marital duty of support owed to a wife by
her husband after their legal relationship terminated. Today, the terms "maintenance" or "support" generally are preferred, see UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308, 9A U.L.A. 147 (1987),
because alimony has a connotation of fault, although, in substance, the terms all relate to the
provision of sustenance or means of living. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 67 (5th rev. ed. 1979)
(alimony); id. at 859 (maintenance); id. at 1291 (support). This Article, therefore, uses the terms
interchangeably, with a focus on support.
26. For discussions of the lack of clarity between support and property at the state level, see
Feder, The Contempt Dilemma: Support vs. Property and Third Party Debts (Part2), FLA. B.J.,
Jan. 1985, at 67, and Comment, California Divorce Agreements-Alimony or Property Settlement?, 2 STAN. L. REv. 731 (1950).
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practical.2 7 Although property division and temporary support awards
may fulfill the function of supporting a dependent, their non-traditional
forms potentially subject many of those debts to discharge in bankruptcy. While bankruptcy courts will look behind the parties' labels or
the state-law classification of a debt,2 8 the federal courts have yet to
arrive at a uniform and comprehensive federal standard for
categorization.
This Article evaluates the major issues confronted by the courts in
determining dischargeability of divorce-related debts and analyzes the
courts' treatment of those issues. This Article attempts to resolve the
inconsistencies and ambiguities in the existing bankruptcy law by reconciling the history and statutory language of section 523(a)(5) with the
conflicting policies of providing the debtor an economic fresh start,
while assuring the debtor's dependents a continuing source of support.
This Article proposes a federal approach that accommodates nontraditional and innovative forms of support and that is consistent with
contemporary state family law policies regarding continued support following family dissolution.
To arrive at a uniform federal definition of nondischargeable debts
under section 523(a)(5), the courts must consider not only the development of the support exception under bankruptcy law, but the historical
bases of intrafamily support obligations and the current role of support
in modern family law. Part II of this Article outlines current state-law
concepts of support and property division and concludes that support is
a relative concept based on the traditional doctrine of "necessaries."
Part III illustrates that, historically, bankruptcy law paralleled family
law in defining support until the emergence of non-traditional forms of
support obscured the underlying nature of support obligations. Part IV
recommends an analytical framework, suggested by the 1983 Sixth Circuit decision in In re Calhoun,2 9 that federal courts can utilize to resolve the problems of classification for dischargeability purposes. This
analysis invokes and revitalizes the "necessaries" doctrine, which will
result in a federal bankruptcy standard of support that is consistent
with the role of support in modern divorce law.

27. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
28. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(B) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295
(1939), rev'g 100 F.2d 830 (4th Cir. 1939); Stout v. Prussel, 691 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1982).
29.

715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983).

8
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STATE LAW DEVELOPMENT

Post-MaritalSpousal Support

The common-law duty of support, exclusively a function of state
law,3 0 required a man to support his wife and children solely because of
their legal relationship.3 1 The duty was based on the notion of dependency, which, although presumed in all cases, was real in most instances.3 2 When the family unit was intact, courts were reluctant to
interfere with a man's discretion in setting the33level of support and presumed that the duty of support was fulfilled.
Courts tempered this attitude of noninterference with the doctrine
of necessaries, which protected dependents from nonsupport by holding
a husband or father liable to third parties who supplied essential goods
or services to his dependents when the husband or father failed to provide those items himself.3 4 The scope of the necessaries doctrine de30. Under the "domestic relations exception" to federal subject matter jurisdiction, developed in a long line of cases beginning with Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1859), the
federal courts have refused to hear cases involving family law matters, including issues of support,
despite the existence of diversity of citizenship. See, e.g., In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890);
Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1975), rev'g 373 F. Supp 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1974). Although the doctrine has eroded to some extent, see Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1978);
Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d. 509 (2d Cir. 1973), it nevertheless remains vital with respect to the common-law duty of support.
31. See W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATZ, AMERICAN FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION 281 (1983); see also
H. CLARK, supra note 7, at 181.
32. H. CLARK, supra note 7, at 181.
33. See McGuire v. McGuire, 157 Neb. 226, 59 N.W.2d 336 (1953); H. CLARK, supra note 7, at
181.
34. One commentator describes the necessaries doctrine as the common law's "customary
method for enforcing the husband's duty to support his family [by permitting] the wife or child to
buy what they needed and charge it to the husband .... [T]he husband was thereby made responsible directly to the merchant who supplied the goods to the wife or child." H. CLARK, supra note
7, at 189.
The necessaries doctrine, however, had a number of qualifications. For instance, courts refused
to apply the doctrine to money or articles gratuitously supplied to wives or children; nor would
courts find the husband liable when the husband previously had supplied his dependents with
necessaries. Furthermore, if the wife wrongfully lived apart from her husband, he incurred no liability. Some courts held the doctrine inapplicable if merchants extended credit directly to the
husband. Because of the risk to the merchant or supplier, the doctrine had limited value in enforcing the duty of support. Id.
Although the common-law necessaries doctrine created liability only in the husband or father,
more recent decisions have extended its application to both spouses. See Jersey Shore Medical
Center-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 417 A.2d 1003 (1980); Richland Memorial
Hosp. v. Burton, 282 S.C. 159, 318 S.E.2d 12 (1984); In re Estate of Stromsted, 99 Wis. 2d 136, 299
N.W.2d 226 (1980). The Supreme Court of Virginia took the opposite approach and judicially abolished the doctrine as outdated and violative of equal protection. Shilling v. Bedford County Memorial Hosp., 225 Va. 539, 303 S.E.2d 905 (1983). The Virginia legislature, however, reinstated the
doctrine, declaring it equally applicable to both spouses. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-37 (1986); see
also Mahoney, Economic Sharing During Marriage: Equal Protection,Spousal Support and the
Doctrine of Necessaries, 22 J. FAM. L. 221 (1983-84); Note, The Unnecessary Doctrine of Neces-
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pended on the family's standard of living and the man's ability to
provide;s 5 support, therefore, was defined in terms of relative need, even
within the context of an ongoing family relationship.
The idea of need as a relative concept was used by state courts to
set the actual measure of support upon dissolution of the family unit.
After divorce," courts determined the level of support owed former
wives s3 with reference to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, which meant balancing the needs of the wife against the means
and ability of the husband, according to the parties' station in life."8
Although the concept of post-marital spousal support in the form
of alimony is somewhat incongruous, since the underlying basis for the
support obligation-the marriage itself-has terminated, 9 courts have
justified alimony as a means of protecting society at large from the burden of providing for destitute former wives. 0 Furthermore, in the past,
alimony generally was available only to an innocent wife because it was
meant to compensate an injured woman who had been deprived of her
means of support and legitimate expectations through no fault of her

own,41 while punishing her derelict husband.42

Alimony could be ordered as a liquidated amount, payable from
the husband's existing property, in a lump sum or installments.43 More
typically, alimony was awarded on a permanent basis,'44 payable periodsaries, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1767 (1984); Comment, The New Doctrine of Necessaries in Virginia, 19
U. RICH. L. REV. 317 (1985).
35. H. CLARK, supra note 7, at 190 (defining necessaries as "articles or services reasonably
appropriate for the support of wife and child, bearing in mind both their needs and the husband's
means," or "whatever is suitable to the family's economic position"); see State v. Clark, 88 Wash.
2d 533, 563 P.2d 1253 (1977) (construing family expense statute as broadly as necessaries doctrine,
including liability for wife's legal expenses); see also Long v. Carter, 39 N.M. 255, 44 P.2d 1040
(1935) (necessaries include more than absolute essentials).
36. Courts intervened when the family separated without dissolving the legal marital relationship, as well as when an absolute divorce was granted. See W. WADLINGTON, CASES AND OTHER
MATERIALS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 894, 994-98 (successor ed. 1984).
37. The same general principles applied to the father's duty to support his children who were
not in his custody. See H. CLARK, supra note 7, at 188.
38. See id. at 198-99, 441-45.
39. Id. at 421.
40. See Burtoff v. Burtoff, 418 A.2d 1085 (D.C. 1980); Alibrando v. Alibrando, 375 A.2d 9
(D.C. 1977); Majette v. Majette, 261 A.2d 824 (D.C. 1970); cf. Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728
(Colo. 1982) (state interested in maintenance provision in antenuptial contract to prevent spouse
from becoming public charge).
41. See H. CLARK, supra note 7, at 420.
42. Id. at 421-22; Martin v. Martin, 366 So. 2d 475 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Oliver v. Oliver,
285 So. 2d 638 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
43. See H. CLARK, supra note 7, at 447 (noting that some states do not permit alimony in
gross, absent statutory authority).
44. The term "permanent alimony" does not imply that the payments may not be terminated or modified upon showing of sufficient change of circumstances; rather, the term refers to
alimony payable in installments over an indefinite period that may be terminated upon the occur-
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ically from the husband's future income."' Although its form could vary,
alimony was always based in theory on the marital duty of support.
Therefore, in determining the appropriate amount of alimony in an individual case, courts defined the general level of support by evaluating
the parties' relative financial circumstances." Need, therefore, was the
primary criterion for calculating support, but relative need, not absolute need, was the relevant standard.4" Because of the historical compensatory and punitive aspects of alimony, however, marital fault was
often a major factor in the support calculation, despite its lack of relationship to actual need.4
At least in earlier times, alimony often was imperative because
married women had severely limited property rights and were seldom
equipped to be self-supporting.49 As states removed legal restrictions on
married women5" and women began entering the job market in greater
numbers, 5' however, alimony lost much of its conceptual justification,
because many divorced women were capable of supporting themselves.
In recent years, not only have courts extended the duty of marital and
post-marital support to both spouses irrespective of gender, 2 but the
rence of some contingency. See Couzens v. Couzens, 140 Mich. App. 423, 428, 364 N.W.2d 340, 343
(1985); Welch v. Welch, 112 Mich. App. 524, 526, 316 N.W.2d 258, 259 (1982).
45. See H. CLARK, supra note 7, at 447 (noting a preference for periodic alimony even when
alimony in gross is authorized).
46. See id. at 443-47.
47. See W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATZ, supra note 31, at 315. Factors considered in determining
the amount of alimony varied among jurisdictions, but generally included such factors as the age,
health, education, and work skills of the parties, the length of the marriage, and the custody of
minor children. See H. CLARK, supra note 7, at 442-48. While the extent of the husband's assets
was relevant, the wife's own property sometimes was not a permissible factor to consider in setting
the amount of an alimony award. See Bowzer v. Bowzer, 236 Mo. App. 514, 155 S.W.2d 530 (1941);
McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 207 Misc. 700, 142 N.Y.S.2d 407 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955).
48. See W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATZ, supra note 31, at 314-16.
49. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 444 (Cooley 4th ed.
1899); 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 525-27 (3d ed. 1923); W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATZ,
supra note 31, at 281, 314; Bartke & Zurralec, The Low, Middle and High Road to MaritalProperty Reform in Common Law Jurisdictions,COMMUNITY PROP. J. 201-02 (1980); Comment, The
Development of Sharing Principles in Common Law Marital Property States, 28 UCLA L. REV.
1269, 1272-76 (1981).
50. Near the beginning of the twentieth century, every state enacted Married Women's Property Acts, which removed many of the legal disabilities imposed on married women and permitted
them to own property. H. CLARK, supra note 7, § 7.2; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 708.08 (West 1969
& Supp. 1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209 (West 1958 & Supp. 1987). See generally Chused,
Late Nineteenth Century Married Women's Property Law: Reception of the Early Married
Women's Property Acts by Courts and Legislatures, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 3 (1985) (outlining
history of Oregon married women's property law).
51. See C. FooT, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 606-07 (3d ed.
1985). About half of married women, however, especially those with preschool children, still are not
employed outside the home, and women's earning power continues to lag substantially behind that

of men. See J. KRAUSKOPF.
52.

CASES ON PROPERTY DIVISION AT MARRIAGE DISSOLUTION

5-6 (1983).

See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (statute authorizing alimony for wives, but not hus-
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emphasis has shifted to actual dependency and need, relative to the
parties' overall circumstances, as the primary criteria for continuing
spousal support after the dissolution of marriage.
Non-traditional forms of support have evolved during the past few
decades. Temporary support, in the form of rehabilitative alimony, frequently is promoted to encourage and facilitate self-support and to
eliminate a perpetual drain on a former supporting spouse.5 3 Additionally, certain types of intangible marital acquisitions or achievements
that have economic implications do not fit neatly into traditional dissolution awards.5 4 To compensate the spouse who contributed to these
intangible "assets" for lost financial expectations caused by divorce,
and to avoid unjust enrichment of the acquiring spouse, many courts
recently have developed a hybrid type of award, often referred to as
reimbursement alimony. 55 Although clearly capable of functioning as
bands, is unconstitutional), rev'g 351 So. 2d 904 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977); Murphey v. Murphey, 103
Idaho 720, 653 P.2d 441 (1982) (interpreting statute to apply benefits in gender-neutral manner;
statute subsequently replaced by nondiscriminatory IDAHO CODE § 32-705 (1983)); see also FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 61.08 (West 1975). In practice, however, the wife usually remains the dependent
spouse and recipient of alimony. Munson, supra note 14, at 177.
53. See W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATZ, supra note 31, at 320; Otis v. Otis, 299 N.W.2d 114 (Minn.
1980); Lovato v. Lovato, 98 N.M. 11, 644 P.2d 525 (1982). But cf. Walter v. Walter, 464 So. 2d 538
(Fla. 1985) (indicating that preference for rehabilitative alimony does not limit court to awarding
permanent alimony only as last resort); see also Comment, Rehabilitative Alimony-A Matter of
Discretion or Direction?, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 285 (1984).
54. Typically these intangible "assets" include professional degrees, licenses, and practices,
and various types of employment benefits that were acquired by one spouse during the marriage
with the other partner's assistance by means of financial contribution, household services, emotional support, or foregone opportunity. In O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 587, 489 N.E.2d 712,
717, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 748 (1985), the court observed: "Limiting a working spouse to a maintenance award, either general or rehabilitative, not only is contrary to the economic partnership
concept underlying the statute but also retains the uncertain and inequitable economic ties of
dependence that the Legislature sought to extinguish by equitable distribution." The O'Brien
court concluded that a wife acquired a property interest in her husband's medical license for purposes of equitable division of marital property. 66 N.Y.2d at 586, 489 N.E.2d at 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d
at 748; see also In re Marriage of King, 150 Cal. App. 3d 304, 197 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1983) (property
interest in business developed during marriage includes goodwill); In re Marriage of White, 98 Ill.
App. 3d 380, 424 N.E.2d 421 (1981) (same); In re Marriage of Hull, 712 P.2d 1317 (Mont. 1986)
(goodwill in medical practice is marital property); Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d 1 (1983)
(goodwill in professional practice constitutes marital property). But see Powell v. Powell, 231 Kan.
App. 2d 456, 648 P.2d 218 (1982) (goodwill not subject to division on divorce); Archer v. Archer,
303 Md. 347, 493 A.2d 1074 (1985) (professional degree is not property); Lehmicke v. Lehmicke,
339 Pa. Super. 559, 489 A.2d 782 (1985) (same); Holbrook v. Holbrook, 103 Wis. 2d 327, 309
N.W.2d 343 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981) (same). See generally Bruch, The Definition and Division of
Marital Property in California: Towards Parity and Simplicity, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 771 (1982);
Krauskopf, Recompense for FinancingSpouse's Education: Legal Protectionfor the Marital Investor in Human Capital,28 U. KAN. L. REv. 379 (1980).
55. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.3 (West Supp. 1987) (providing that payments made from
community property for education or training of spouse or for repayment of loan for same reimbursable on divorce; consideration of education, training, or enhancement or amount of reimbursement for purposes of awarding support not limited by this statute). See generally Note,
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support, reimbursement alimony is difficult to classify as either support
or property division. These non-traditional forms of support, as well as
lump sum alimony, may lack the formal features of conventional concepts of support. Furthermore, the role of property division in divorce,
which often fulfills the role of support, has overshadowed the importance of alimony.
B. Property Division
Although most states continue to authorize alimony under appropriate circumstances, property division has become the focal point in
resolving the economic incidents of marriage at the time of divorce. The
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, as well as many state statutes, require a couple's property to be divided prior to determining whether
continued support should be ordered; a dependent spouse's postdivorce need is to be evaluated in light of the property so distributed. 56
At least when sufficient marital property exists, property division can
permit a dependent spouse to become totally or partially selfsupporting and can enable a couple to sever their relationship more
completely and finally.
Except in the eight community property states,57 which deem most
property acquired during marriage to be owned equally by the
spouses,58 ownership of a married couple's property traditionally has
been attributed to title. 9 In the past, and to a significant extent today,
title usually could be traced to the husband as the primary wage earner
in the marital relationship. Thus, to divide property on divorce was to
allocate most of the accumulations of the marriage to the husband-a
result widely regarded as inequitable.6 0 Societal and legal concepts of
Matrimonial Law-Equitable Distribution-Natureof a Professional Degree-TraditionalAli-

mony Can Be Restructured to Provide Reimbursement to a Spouse Who Supports His or Her
Partner in the Quest for an Advanced Degree-Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527
(1982), 14 SETON HALL 437 (1984).
56. See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308, 9A U.L.A. 147, 347-48 (1987); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 518.55 (West 1978 & Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-5-101(d)(7) (1984 & Supp. 1987).

57. The eight traditional community property states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, New Mexico, Nevada, Texas, and Washington. Wisconsin, historically a common-law property
state, adopted a community property system in 1983 by enacting the Uniform Marital Property
Act. 1983 Wis. Laws 186, §§ 8-20 (codified at Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766 (West Supp. 1986)).
58. See generally W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY (2d ed.

1971);

W. MCCLANAHAN, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

(1982).

59. See Comment, supra note 49. About half the common-law jurisdictions permitted reallocation of separately titled property upon divorce prior to the enactment of equitable distribution
statutes, although application of those statutes has been severely limited. See R LEvY, UNIFORM
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS, app. B, Property Divisions (1968),

cited in J. KRAUSKOPF, supra note 51, at 8.
60. See Johnston, Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition,the Law School Curriculum, and Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1033, 1036 (1972); Krauskopf &
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marriage have shifted toward the community property view of marriage
as a partnership enterprise. This view recognizes that a spouse who contributed to the relationship in nonmonetary, intangible ways, as well as
the party who supplied the funds for acquisitions, should share in the
accumulated property when the marriage terminates by divorce. Today,
all common-law jurisdictions allocate property upon divorce based on
theories of equitable distribution, which acknowledge ownership rights
of both marital partners in a manner comparable to community property theory."'
Although variations exist among equitable distribution schemes,,2
the general approach is the same: once a court isolates the divisible pool
of property, it allocates the property between the spouses in an equitable manner.6 3 Courts determine the proportionate share of property to
which each spouse is entitled by applying a variety of factors generally
related to the spouses' needs, their capacity for self-support and ability
to
acquire
property
after divorce,
as well as of
their
respective
tangible
andfurther
intangible
contributions
to the614acquisition
property
dur-

Thomas, PartnershipMarriage: The Solution to an Ineffective and Inequitable Law of Support,
35 OHIO ST. L.J. 558 (1974); Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and Demoralization, Together with Criticism and Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 45 (1981).
61. See Freed & Walker, supra note 2. The community property states, except for California,
New Mexico, and Louisiana, permit unequal division of community assets at divorce. See J.
KRAUSKOPF,

supra note 51, at 13.

62. Two general types of equitable distribution systems have been adopted in common-law
jurisdictions: the "all property" and "dual property" approaches. "All property" statutes subject
all assets to distribution, regardless of how or when the assets were acquired, see, e.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46b-81(a) (West 1986 & Supp. 1987); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 34 (West Supp.
1987); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 552.19, 552.23, 552.407 (1967 & Supp. 1987); NEB. REV. STAT. §
42-365, 42-366 (1984). "Dual property" statutes require that property be categorized as either marital or separate and permit division of only the former, see, e.g., ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 503
(Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1987); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 518.54 (1969 & Supp. 1987); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1987); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5) (Consol. 1986 & Supp. 1987),
which constitutes an application of community property principles for the limited purpose of distribution on divorce. See J. KRAUSKOPF, supra note 51, at 14-16; Scheible, Marital Property in
Tennessee: An Evolution, Not a Revolution, 15 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 475, 485 (1985).
63. Some jurisdictions presume an equal division, absent facts that indicate such a division
would be unfair. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 32-712(1)(a) (1983 & Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5020(c) (Supp. 1986); see also Krauskopf, A Theory for "Just"Division of Marital Propertyin Missouri, 41 Mo. L. REV. 165, 176-77 (1976) (stating that presumption of equal division consistent with
partnership theory of marriage). Most states apply a statutory or judicially created list of factors to
determine the equitable share of each spouse. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 503 (SmithHurd 1980 & Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-121(e)(2) (Supp. 1987); cf. Foster, Commentary
on Equitable Distribution,26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1, 31-32 (1981) (noting that presumption of
equal division could result in inadequate consideration of relevant factors).
64. See J. KRAUSKOPF, supra note 51, at 226 (indicating that the major purpose of many
states' equitable law is to provide for future support needs); UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT
prefatory note, 9A U.L.A. 147 (1987) (asserting that property division should be primary means of
providing for future support).
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ing the marriage.6 Many factors in the property division analysis are
similar to those applied in awarding alimony, although marital fault
typically is excluded from consideration in property division.6
While ideally, in either community property or equitable distribution states, property division is accomplished by physically separating
the couple's assets, the division frequently must be achieved or supplemented by one spouse's payment of a fixed sum of money to the other
in installments over time or by one spouse's assumption of sole responsibility for specified marital debts. Regardless of how it is accomplished,
property division often operates to provide support for a dependent
spouse. Therefore, in form and in function, a property division debt frequently resembles a support debt.
C. Private Contracting
Contracts between divorcing couples further may obscure the distinctions between property division and support obligations. In the recent past, state law severely restricted married couples in their legal

ability to contract with each other prior to, during, and at the termination of marriage, especially if the couple attempted to alter the marital
duty of support.6 7 Today, states grant married couples significant freedom in contracting between themselves with respect to their property
rights6" and, to a lesser extent, post-marital support.6 9 Antenuptial con65. See, e.g., In re Marriage of McMahon, 82 Ill. App. 3d 1126, 403 N.E.2d 730 (1980); In re
Marriage of Cornell, 550 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); In re Marriage of Knudson, 186 Mont. 8,
606 P.2d 130 (1979).

66. See UNIF. MARRIAGE

AND DIVORCE

ACT § 307, 9A U.L.A. 147, 238-39 (1987); see also supra

note 3 and accompanying text. One commentator notes that marital fault is "one of the most
controversial issues" in property division. L. GOLDEN, supra note 3, at 255.
67. See Sharp, Divorce and the Third Party:Spousal Support, PrivateAgreements, and the
State, 59 N.C.L. REV. 819 (1981); W. WADLINGTON, supra note 36, at 1137; see also In re Duncan's
Estate, 87 Colo. 149, 285 P. 757 (1930) (voiding antenuptial agreement providing for property division on divorce as promoting dissolution); Romeo v. Romeo, 84 N.J. 289, 418 A.2d 258 (1980)
(reversing common law to extent that employee spouse may recover worker's compensation
benefits).
68. See Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970) (permitting premarital contracts for
property division if stringent test for validity met); Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla.
1962) (same). See generally S. GREEN & J. LONG, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LAW AGREEMENTS (1984);
A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NuPTIAL CONTRACTS (1985); Sharp, FairnessStandards and Separation Agreements: A Word of Caution on Contractual Freedom, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 1399 (1984).
69. See Sharp, supra note 67, at 861-65; Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1982)
(applying conscionability standard to maintenance provisions of antenuptial contract, but not to
property division terms); Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970) (support terms of premarital
agreement may be modified to reflect change of circumstances since original contract). Contracts
purporting to waive or eliminate the duty of support remain invalid in a few jurisdictions. See
Mulford v. Mulford, 211 Neb. 747, 320 N.W.2d 470 (1982); Duncan v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).
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tracts, property settlements, and separation agreements are encouraged
in divorce cases, 0 provided the parties comply with certain fairness and
disclosure requirements.7 1 More often than not, divorcing parties today
will negotiate an agreement or stipulate 7to2 terms regarding their economic interests rather than litigate them.

Negotiation of a post-marital contract allows the parties to extend
support obligations beyond the time and to a greater extent than the
law otherwise would impose.7 On the other hand, contractual waivers
of spousal support generally are enforceable, 4 as are agreements concerning post-divorce treatment of the contractual terms.7 5 A dependent
spouse may be willing to waive or accept a lower amount of support in
exchange for a more favorable property settlement. In such cases, a
property settlement obviously functions as support.
The same factors that a court would consider in a litigated case
generally influence a divorcing couple's private negotiations; the poten70. See
DIVORCE ACT

9A U.L.A. 419 (Supp. 1987);
§ 306, 9A U.L.A. 147, 216-17 (1987).
UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT,

UNIF. MARRIAGE AND

71. See In re Estate of Benker, 416 Mich. 681, 331 N.W.2d 193 (1982) (discussing elements of
valid antenuptial agreement, including presumption of nondisclosure); Levine v. Levine, 56 N.Y.2d
42, 436 N.E.2d 476, 451 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1982) (presenting standards for valid separation agreement);
FLA. STAT. ANN. 732.702 (West 1976 & Supp. 1987) (indicating that disclosure not required if contract executed prior to marriage but required if executed after marriage); VA. CODE §§ 20-147

to -154 (Supp. 1987);

UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, 9A U.L.A. 419 (Supp. 1987); UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 306, 9A U.L.A. 147, 216-27 (1987) (separation agreement). See generally

Sharp, supra note 67, at 832-38; Sharp, supra note 68, at 1407-60.
72. See Levy, Comment on the Pearson-Thoennes Study and on Mediation, 17 FAM. L.Q.
525, 530 (1984) (estimating 85% to 90% of divorce actions resolved by negotiation); Weitzman,
The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child
Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181, 1195 (1981) (noting increased use of private settlements);
see also W. WADLINGTON, supra note 36, at 1137.
73. See Simpson v. Simpson, 108 So. 2d 632 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (estate of father
bound by separation agreement to continue child support); Bell v. Bell, 393 Mass. 20, 468 N.E.2d
859 (1984) (holding that clause providing that alimony should terminate upon wife's cohabitation
with appearance of marriage enforceable), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1027 (1985); Taylor v. Gowetz,
339 Mass. 294, 158 N.E.2d 677 (1959) (holding that alimony payments enforceable against estate);
cf. Knox v. Remick, 371 Mass. 433, 358 N.E.2d 432 (1976) (stating that cohabitation clause to be
interpreted narrowly; support should not be contingent on unjust and unreasonable conditions
because of inferior bargaining power of wife).
74. See Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1982); Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381
(Fla. 1970). Child support, on the other hand, may not be contracted away. See Kaiser v. Kaiser,

290 Minn. 173, 186 N.W.2d 678 (1971);

UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE

ACT § 306(f), 9A U.L.A. 147,

217 (1987).
75. For example, the parties' contractual agreement to bar modification of a spousal support

award will be upheld in some jurisdictions, even when the agreement has been merged into a court
decree. See Lay v. Lay, 162 Colo. 43, 425 P.2d 704 (1967); Kaiser v. Kaiser, 290 Minn. 173, 186
N.W.2d 678 (1971). But see Spingola v. Spingola, 91 N.M. 737, 580 P.2d 958 (1978) (alimony provision merged into decree may be modified despite contractual term to the contrary); C. FOOTE, R.
LEVY & F. SANDER, supra note 51, at 722 (observing that most courts hold power to modify support
provisions unaltered by parties' agreement).
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tial for litigation if a husband and wife cannot agree will color their
demands and expectations.76 Thus, a spouse may be willing to forgo
some rights or make certain economic concessions if the likelihood of a
contested divorce exists or the spouse is anxious to end the marriage.
Additionally, the couple must reach an agreement that will be acceptable to the divorce court. The divorce decree frequently merges the private agreement, converting the contract into a judicial order." Thus,
because the same principles will guide both a contractual arrangement
and a court order, the contractual arrangement will accommodate the
dependent spouse's actual needs regardless of its final form.
D. Implications of Categorization
A clear theoretical basis exists for distinguishing support, which is
based on a spouse's legal duty, from property division, which is based
on ownership. In practice, however, precise classification of a debt as
one or the other is often difficult because of the formal and functional
similarities between spousal support and property division.78
In the past, characterization of an obligation by a state court as
either support or property division could result in crucial differences in
post-divorce treatment of the obligation. Support payments lasted only
for the lifetime of either party because the duty of support ended on
death of either." Similarly, remarriage of the recipient generally terminated the obligation to pay support, because the new spouse incurred
the duty."' The divorce court usually retained jurisdiction of support
76. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce,
L.J. 950 (1979).
77. See Johnston v. Johnston, 297 Md. 48, 465 A.2d 436 (1983); Day v. Day, 80 Nev. 386, 395
P.2d 321 (1964). Court-decreed support provisions, although usually not property division provisions, differ from mere contractual terms in that the court may modify them upon change of circumstances and may enforce them through contempt proceedings. Whether contractual terms have
been merged into a decree or whether they survive independently has been a continuing constructional problem. See Sharp, supra note 67, at 847-53; see also C. FOOTE, R. LEvY & F. SANDER, supra
note 51, at 721-23; Comment, Divorce Agreements: Independent Contractor Incorporationin Decree, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 138 (1952).
78. The difficulty stems not only from the similarities of form and function but also because
the language used to create an obligation in either a court decree or a private agreement frequently
is imprecise and ambiguous. Property divisions and support obligations are often created in a single, integrated instrument, with little or no delineation as to the precise nature of its terms. Sharp,
supra note 67, at 826-27.
79. See H. CLARK, supra note 7, at 461-63.
80. Id.; Price v. Price, 243 Ga. 4, 252 S.E.2d 402 (1979); UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT
§ 316(b), 9A U.L.A. 147, 490 (1987). Furthermore, a number of jurisdictions have enacted statutes
that terminate support when the recipient lives in unmarried conjugal cohabitation. See, e.g., ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 510(b) (Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1987). The majority of these jurisdictions apply an economic test to determine whether cohabitation should affect spousal support. See
Annotation, Divorced Woman's Subsequent Sexual Relations or Misconduct as Warranting,
Along or with Other Circumstances, Modification of Alimony Decree, 98 A.L.R.3d 453 (1980 &
88
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orders indefinitely and could modify the obligation upon a material
change of circumstances concerning either party's relative need or ability to pay."1 In addition, the recipient could enforce judicially ordered
support payments by invoking the court's contempt power.8 2 The distinction between support and property division was relevant on the federal level as well: the Internal Revenue Code made qualifying spousal
support deductible from the payor's income for tax purposes, with a
8 3
corresponding recognition of taxable income to the recipient.
Converse principles applied to property division obligations. Courts
regarded property division as final and treated an award of payments
pursuant to a property division as an ordinary debt.84 At the death of
either party, unpaid amounts were enforceable by the recipient's estate
against the payor's estate, 5 and property division debts were unaffected
by remarriage or other change of circumstances.86 Even when the terms
of a property settlement were merged into a court decree, the court
could not enforce a property division debt through contempt proceedings. Payments made pursuant to property division had no direct fedSupp. 1986). See generally Note, Alimony, Cohabitation,and the Wages of Sin: A Statutory
Analysis, 33 ALA. L. REV. 577 (1982); Note, Domestic Relations: Oklahoma's Live-In Lover Statute: § 1289(D) of Title 12, 36 OKLA. L. REv. 906 (1983).
81. See H. CLARK, supra note 7, § 14.9; Note, Domestic Relations: Modification of Future
Alimony Payments Due to Changed Circumstances, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 66 (1980). Professor
Michaela White notes that all states will modify future alimony payments, although only a few will
permit retroactive modification of accrued amounts. White, supra note 11, at 32-33. For a state-bystate list of modification provisions, see id. at 32 n.216. Section 316(a) of the Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act requires a change of circumstances "so substantial and continuing as to make the
terms unconscionable" in order to authorize modification. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT
§ 316(a), 9A U.L.A. 147, 489-90 (1987).
82. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.631 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-19
(1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.305 (West 1981); see also Feder, supra note 26, at 67-69 (discussing
use of contempt remedy even in cases when debts not clearly labeled support).
83. I.R.C. § 71 (1982) included as income to a wife periodic payments from her husband, if
made pursuant to a divorce or separate maintenance decree and in discharge of his duty of support. Section 215 granted the husband a corresponding deduction. I.R.C. § 215 (1982). The Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, substantially changed the alimony provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code by eliminating the support and periodicity rules of § 71 and replacing them
with, inter alia, a complex six-year rule and equally complex recapture provisions. The sections
were again revised by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514. See generally O'Connell,
History of the Act, 7 FAM. ADVOc., Fall 1984, at 4; Hopkins, Alimony, 7 FAM. ADVOC., Fall 1984, at
8.
84. See Goggans v. Osborn, 237 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1956); Dailey v. Dailey, 171 Ohio St. 133,
167 N.E.2d 906 (1960).
85. See Farrand v. Farrand, 246 Iowa 488, 67 N.W.2d 20 (1954).
86. See Goggans v. Osborn, 237 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1956); Flannery v. Flannery, 203 Kan. 239,
452 P.2d 846 (1969); Dailey v. Dailey, 171 Ohio St. 133, 167 N.E.2d 906 (1960); Annotation, Alimony as Affected by Wife's Remarriage, in Absence of Controlling Specific Statute, 48 A.L.R.2d
270 (1956).
87. See Luna v. Luna, 125 Ariz. 120, 608 P.2d 57 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1

eral income tax consequences."8
Today, the distinctions between support and property division
have lost much of their practical impact. Because of the extensive use
of private contracts, parties frequently alter the consequences that
death, remarriage, or changed circumstances have on the payments.
Court-ordered support obligations in the form of lump sum, rehabilitative, or reimbursement alimony may be treated like property divisions.8 9 Some courts, recognizing the practical effect of property
division as support, authorize enforcement of property divisions
through contempt proceedings, as well as by the more circular method
of ordering specific performance subject to enforcement by a contempt
order.9 0 Likewise, under federal income tax amendments, either spousal
support or property division can be structured by the parties to be deductible by the payor, while taxable to the recipient.9 1
Because of the diminishing distinctions between support and property division, both state and federal law acknowledge that today property division and support frequently are functional equivalents. The
final area in which classification remains critical-perhaps anachronistically-is in bankruptcy. Due largely to historical developments and
conflicting policies, and perhaps primarily due to a lack of understanding of state law concepts of support, property division debts remain dischargeable in bankruptcy; debts in the nature of support are not.
Federal courts should discern the inherent nature of a divorce-related
debt under federal bankruptcy law by considering the contemporary
family law meaning of support in light of the new forms for fulfilling
the support obligation. To achieve this goal, the federal judiciary must
88. The Davis rule treated property transfers between spouses as a "sale," which subjected
such transfers to capital gain treatment. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962) (requiring
recognition of gain or loss on transfer of property between spouses in exchange for release of marital rights). The Davis rule was repealed by § 1041 of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984. I.R.C.
§ 1041 (Supp. III 1985) (no gain or loss on transfer between spouses incident to divorce, except for
nonresident alien transferor); see Kittrell, Property Transfers, 7 FAm. ADvoc., Fall 1984, at 22.
89. See Olson v. Olson, 114 Ill. App. 3d 28, 448 N.E.2d 229 (1983) (maintenance in gross not
modifiable); Doerflinger v. Doerfiinger, 646 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (lump sum maintenance award payable in installments not modifiable); Gunkel v. Gunkel, 633 S.W.2d 108 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1982) (maintenance in gross survives former spouse's death or remarriage).
90. See In re Marriage of Ramos, 126 Ill. App. 3d 391, 466 N.E.2d 1016 (1984) (property
settlement and maintenance provisions of dissolution decree enforceable through contempt proceedings), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985); Smoot v. Smoot, 329 N.W.2d 829 (Minn. 1983) (contempt order valid sanction for failure to comply with property division decree); Huber v. Huber,
649 S.W.2d 955 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (same).
91. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. One commentator has stated that "recent
developments in the substantive law of support and its relationship to determination of marital
property rights raise important questions about the relevance of any concept of support to the tax
incidents. Do the conditions imposed on taxable alimony accurately reflect state law concepts of
support or maintenance?" W. WADLINGTON, supra note 36, at 287 (Supp. 1987).
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focus on the relative nature of support as it originated in the doctrine of
necessaries.
III.

BANKRUPTCY LAW DEVELOPMENT

A. Pre-Code Development
The early development in bankruptcy law of the exception from
discharge for support obligations parallels the evolution in state family
law of the concept of support. Throughout this century, American
bankruptcy law has continuously protected support obligations from
discharge9 2 to assure a continued source of support both to society and
the individual dependents. Although no express statutory provision existed in the nineteenth-century versions of the Bankruptcy Act,93 the
United States Supreme Court formulated an exception from discharge
for support obligations in a trilogy of cases beginning in 1901 with Audubon v. Shufeldt9
In Audubon the Court held that the debtor's general discharge affected neither alimony arrearages nor alimony accruing after bankruptcy. The Court reasoned that alimony, unlike other debts, is not
dischargeable because:
Alimony does not arise from any business transaction, but from the relation of
marriage. It is not founded on contract, express or implied, but on the natural and
legal duty of the husband to support the wife... . Permanent alimony is regarded
rather as a portion of the husband's estate to which the wife is equitably entitled,
than as strictly a debt ....
5

Because of its unique legal features, the Court regarded alimony as the
continuation of a duty imposed by law rather than a debt in the conventional sense.96 And because it was not a "debt," an alimony award
could not be "proved" in bankruptcy.97 Thus, the alimony award re92. A few early cases, however, decided under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 ch. 541, 30 Stat.
544 (1898), allowed discharge of alimony, for both arrearages and future payments. See In re
Houston, 94 F. 119 (D. Ky. 1899); Fite v. Fite, 110 Ky. 197, 61 S.W. 26 (1901). Others discharged
only past due alimony payments. See In re Challoner, 98 F. 82 (N.D. Ill. 1899); In re Van Orden,
96 F. 86 (D.N.J. 1899). In In re Lachemeyer, 14 F. Cas. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1878) (No. 7966), the court
held that the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 discharged neither arrearages nor post-bankruptcy alimony.
Some courts reached the same result under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. See, e.g., In re Nowell, 99
F. 931 (D. Mass. 1900); In re Shepard, 97 F. 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1899).
93. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898); Bankruptcy Act of 1867 ch. 176, 14
Stat. 517 (1867).
94. 181 U.S. 575 (1901).
95. Id. at 577-78.
96. Id.
97. Section 63 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 included among provable debts "'a fixed liability, as evidenced by a judgment or an instrument in writing, absolutely owing,' at the time of
the petition in bankruptcy, whether then payable or not, and debts 'founded upon a contract,
expressed or implied.'" Audubon, 181 U.S. at 577 (quoting Bankruptcy Act of 1898 ch. 541, § 63,
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mained intact because discharge released a debtor only from his provable debts. 8
Although the Audubon Court distinguished alimony from a contractual debt, two years later in Dunbar v. Dunbar99 the Supreme Court
extended the holding of Audubon to include as nondischargeable a contractually created alimony obligation."' ° The Court in Dunbar focused
on the contingent nature of the obligation,10 ' and concluded that it was
not provable and therefore was not dischargeable. Similarly, the Court
found contractual child support, payable to the wife, to be likewise nondischargeable. Emphasizing the nature and source of the obligation, the
Court again held that the contract did not affect the underlying duty of
support. Rather, the contract was merely a recognition, presumably reasonable in amount, of the father's legal obligation to support his children. 10 2 Since, the Court reasoned, it was unlikely that Congress

intended to abrogate this duty by discharge in bankruptcy, it would be
illogical to permit discharge when the father had acknowledged his responsibility by contract. The Dunbar Court thereby authorized protection of support payments regardless of whether the payments
originated involuntarily by court order or voluntarily by contract.
The Court's emphasis in Audubon and Dunbar on the contingent
nature of the obligation was consistent with the state-law idea that support, by its nature, was indefinite because it was determined by the parties' relative needs and abilities, which could vary over time. In 1904,
however, in Wetmore v. Markoe, 0 3 the Supreme Court deemphasized
the contingency aspect by declaring that even when an alimony award
was not modifiable, 04 arrearages, as well as later installments, remained
30 Stat. 562-63 (1898)).
98. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 ch. 541, § 1, 30 Stat. 544, 544 (1898).
99. 190 U.S. 340 (1903).
100. The contract at issue in Dunbar was a result of negotiations in which Mrs. Dunbar, a
Massachusetts resident, agreed not to contest her husband's divorce action in Ohio, provided that
suitable support provisions were made for her and their children. Id. at 341. Like most states at
the time, see supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text, Ohio would not grant alimony to a wife
whose husband had been granted a divorce. See Dunbar, 190 U.S. at 344. Therefore, absent the
contract, Mrs. Dunbar would have had no basis for a support claim if Mr. Dunbar had been
granted a divorce. Mr. Dunbar probably signed the contract because he would have been unable to
prove fault grounds sufficient to entitle him to the divorce decree had Mrs. Dunbar contested.
101. The payments to Mrs. Dunbar would terminate upon her death or remarriage. Although
her life expectancy was capable of calculation, the Court concluded that the possibility of her
remarriage was not subject to reasonable evaluation. The Court noted, however, that the English
courts had attempted to make such estimations, which were required by the English Bankruptcy
Act of 1869. Dunbar, 190 U.S. at 346-50.
102. Id. at 351-52.
103. 196 U.S. 68 (1904).
104. Then-existing New York law required an express reservation of the court's power in
order to later modify an alimony award. Id. at 74-75 (citing Walker v. Walker, 155 N.Y. 77, 49 N.E.
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nondischargeable in bankruptcy. The lack of a divorce court's continuing jurisdiction over the award did "not change the essential character
of the liability nor determine whether a claim for alimony is in nature
contractual so as to make it a debt."1 05 According to the Court, the underlying nature, not the form, of the obligation determined its
dischargeability.
The Wetmore Court then pronounced a principle that remains a
polestar in determining dischargeability: a court must look behind the
decree to uncover the true nature and extent of the obligation in determining whether or not the obligation constitutes support. 10 6 That duty
of support, according to the Court, is paramount to the purposes of
bankruptcy law, which are "to relieve the honest debtor from the
weight of indebtedness which has become oppressive and to permit him
to have a fresh start in business or commercial life, freed from the obligations and responsibilities which may have resulted from business misfortunes.' 10 7 The Court indicated, on the other hand, that the
obligation of support should not be avoidable, absent a direct command
from Congress, because alimony was a "legal means of enforcing the
obligation of the husband . . . to support and maintain his wife,"'0 8
rather than a debt.
Although the three Supreme Court cases rested largely on the idea
that a debtor's obligations to a spouse or child escaped discharge because the obligations were not provable debts, the trilogy also emphasized the underlying policy of protecting post-marital support because
it stems from a state-imposed duty created by virtue of the relationship
of the parties. Consistent with then-existing family law theories of support, 10 9 the Court found presumed need, as evidenced by the state court
decree or the couple's contract, to be paramount to actual need. The
trilogy suggests that courts must protect that pre-existing duty of support, based on presumed need arising from legal dependency, over and
above the debtor's bankruptcy rights.
The trilogy provided the basis for interpreting the statutory exception added to the Bankruptcy Act in 1903110 in the wake of Audubon.
663 (1898), and Livingston v. Livingston, 173 N.Y. 377, 66 N.E. 123 (1903)). In many jurisdictions
today, the contrary is true; a court may modify an alimony award upon sufficient proof of change
in the parties' circumstances, unless the award is expressly nonmodifiable. See supra note 81 and
accompanying text.
105. Wetmore, 196 U.S. at 74.

106. Id.
107. Id. at 77.
108.
109.

Id. at 74.
See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text; see also In re Vadner, 259 F. 614, 640 (D.

Nev. 1918).
110.

Bankruptcy Act ch. 487, 32 Stat. 797, 798 (1903).
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Section 17a(2), 111 (later section 17a(7)" 2 ) excepted from discharge debts
"for alimony due or to become due, or for maintenance or support of
wife or child." ' While the language of the support exception remained
essentially unchanged until 1978, judicial interpretation of the exception grew increasingly complex. Once the exception was codified,
courts"" generally regarded support obligations as "debts," and therefore provable; analysis shifted to distinguishing support-related debts
from ordinary contractual obligations. The former survived bankruptcy,
while the latter were discharged.
Early case law interpreting the statutory exception developed
around the policies for the exception. While some courts placed primary
importance on protecting both individual dependents" 5 and society at
large," 6 other courts justified the exception by considering the compensatory and punitive aspects of post-marital support" 7 in accordance
with the prevailing state-law concept of alimony." 8 This latter analysis
was consistent with other statutory exceptions from discharge that effectively were punitive in nature. For instance, debts incurred by fraud,
debts arising from intentional torts, and debts falsified in bankruptcy
pleadings were nondischargeable." 9 Since courts ordered alimony based
upon the debtor's breach of his duty of support, courts similarly penalized the debtor by continuing his responsibility for support debts beyond his general discharge.
The narrow judicial interpretation of the type of obligation that
would qualify as support demonstrates the policy objectives surrounding the exception. Although courts reaffirmed the principle established
in Dunbar, that nondischargeable support debts could arise from contracts as well as court decrees,' 2 0 and extended protection to arrearages
111. Bankruptcy Act ch. 487, § 17a(2), 32 Stat. 797, 798 (1903) (current version codified at 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
112. Bankruptcy Act § 17a(7), 11 U.S.C. § 35a(7) (1976).
113. Bankruptcy Act ch. 487, § 17a(2), 32 Stat. 797, 798 (1903).
114. Before the 1970 amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-467, 84 Stat. 990
(1970), most actions to determine the effect of discharge were heard in state courts. See Swann,
Discharge of Domestic Obligations in Bankruptcy, 43 TENN. L. REv. 231, 234 (1976).
115. See Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904); Gonzalez Hernandez v. Borgos, 343 F.2d
802 (1st Cir. 1965); Poolman v. Poolman, 289 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1961).
116. See Goggans v. Osborn, 237 F.2d 186, 189 (9th Cir. 1956); Fernandes v. Pitta, 47 Cal.
App. 2d 248, 117 P.2d 728 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941); Deen v. Bloomer, 191 Ill. 416, 61 N.E. 131

(1901).
117. See Welty v. Welty, 195 Ill.
335, 63 N.E. 161 (1902) (alimony not debt but penalty for
failure to perform duty); Barclay v. Barclay, 184 Ill. 375, 56 N.E. 636 (1900) (same); Gilchrist v.
Cotton, 83 Ind. App. 415, 148 N.E. 435 (1925) (same).
118. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
119. 11 U.S.C. § 24(c) (1976); see also 3 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL § 9.005 (2d ed. 1954)
(indicating that Congress intended to discharge debts of "honest debtors" only).
120. Schlessinger v. Schlessinger, 39 Colo. 44, 88 P. 970 (1907) (contract); In re Williams, 208
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that had been reduced to judgment,'2 1 courts began to limit the types of
contractual obligations that fell within the exception. The court in In re
2 2 for example, rejected application of the statute to a debt
Ostrander,'
arising from support furnished by a third party after the debtor had
failed to support his dependents himself. In Ostrander the court held
that a debt for medical treatment provided to the debtor's family members at his express or implicit request during an ongoing family relationship was dischargeable. 12 3 The court's extension of liability past
bankruptcy would exclude from discharge any debts incurred for goods
or services that benefited the debtor's wife or children, thus circumventing the fresh start policy of bankruptcy law. 24 The Ostrandercourt
therefore confined nondischargeable debts held by third party creditors
to those analogous to debts on which the debtor would be held liable
25
pursuant to the necessaries doctrine.
Subsequent cases refined the statutory exception by applying it to
involuntary liabilities incurred by the debtor, but not to purchases
made by or with the consent of the debtor, for necessary goods or ser26
vices that merely had the effect of benefiting his family members.
When a third party provided support to a debtor's dependent after the
debtor had reneged on his duty, however, courts would not discharge
the ensuing debt for necessaries. 12 7 Accordingly, bankruptcy law
embraced state family law concepts of support by limiting the support
exception to the debtor's obligations that arose from the common-law
or statutory duty to support his own dependents, 2 8 as circumscribed by
the necessaries doctrine. The countervailing policy of affording the
debtor a fresh start prevailed unless a particular debt clearly fell within
129
the support exception.
After implicitly limiting application of the support exception to
N.Y. 32, 101 N.E. 853 (1913) (court decree).
121. See Westmoreland v. Dodd, 2 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 267 U.S. 595 (1925);
see also Hylek v. Hylek, 148 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1945).
122. 139 F. 592 (E.D.N.Y. 1905).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.; see supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
126. See In re Lo Grasso, 23 F. Supp. 340 (W.D.N.Y. 1938); Schellenberg v. Mullaney, 112
A.D. 384, 98 N.Y.S. 432 (1906); Schwoll v. Meeks, 76 Ohio App. 231, 63 N.E.2d 831 (1944); Wintrode v. Connors, 67 Ohio App. 106, 35 N.E.2d 1018 (1941).
127. The principle applied even if the debtor notified the creditor that he would not assume
responsibility. See In re Meyers, 12 F.2d 938 (W.D.N.Y. 1926) (debt not dischargeable when incurred by third party who had provided shelter for debtor's wife); Leib v. Auerbach, 10 N.J. Super.
391, 76 A.2d 726 (1950).
128. See In re Sullivan, 262 F. 574 (N.D.N.Y. 1920) (exception not applicable to bond securing other's debt). But see Rape v. Lenz, 151 Wash. 675, 276 P. 868 (1929) (duty extends to natural
children even after adoption by third party).
129. See In re Sullivan, 262 F. 574 (N.D.N.Y. 1920).
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debts that could qualify as necessaries, courts extended the limitation
130
to distinguish support obligations from associated property divisions.
For example, courts held as dischargeable payments that constituted
consideration for a release of dower rights or restoration of a wife's
property brought into marriage, because the origin of such debts did
not stem from the husband's duty of support. 131 Early on, courts distinguished property division debts from support debts and permitted discharge of the former in bankruptcy. Although such differentiation was
justified when post-marital support was awarded independently of a
wife's own assets, this differentiation later caused confusion when state
courts began to recognize the interrelationship of support and property
division.
Although courts expressly limited the statutory exception, the
overriding importance of preserving debts that were directly related to
support was apparent in the liberal judicial interpretation of the statute
in other respects. Not only were awards that were unquestionably alimony or child support classified as nondischargeable, but courts
demonstrated their willingness to look beyond the language of an instrument to discern the true nature of the obligation. 132 The substance
of the debt, not its form, controlled, although courts frequently relied
on the existence of the traditional features of alimony awards before
concluding that a debt was support. 3 3 Similarly, classification under
state law would not control dischargeability. 3 4 Nor would a debt's ori130. See In re Jones, 518 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1975); In re Avery, 114 F.2d 768 (6th Cir. 1940).
131. See Heimberger v. Joseph, 55 F.2d 171 (6th Cir. 1931); Tropp v. Tropp, 129 Cal. App.
62, 18 P.2d 385 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1933).
132. See, e.g., Blair v. Blair, 44 Cal. App. 2d 140, 112 P.2d 39 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941)
(agreement to create trust to pay wife monthly installments for her life, with husband to make up
deficiency if trust income insufficient); Remondino v. Remondino, 41 Cal. App. 2d 208, 106 P.2d
437 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1940) (agreement to make monthly payments for support of wife and
maintain life insurance policy for her benefit); Battles v. Battles, 205 Okla. 587, 239 P.2d 794
(1952) (agreement to buy or build house for wife and pay monthly allowance until wife's death or
remarriage). Conversely, description of the debt as alimony or support in the creating instrument
was not determinative either. See, e.g., In re Usher, 442 F. Supp. 866 (N.D. Ga. 1977); see also
Comment, Putative Spousal Support Rights and the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 25 UCLA L. REv.
96, 99-104 (1977); Annotation, Obligation Under Property Settlement Agreement Between
Spouses as Dischargeable in Bankruptcy, 74 A.L.R.2d 758 (1960) (treatment in bankruptcy of
obligations under property settlement agreement).
133. See, e.g., In re Woods, 561 F.2d 27 (7th Cir. 1977); In re Liverman, 463 F. Supp. 906
(E.D. Va. 1978); In re Smith, 436 F. Supp. 469 (N.D. Ga. 1977); In re Alcorn, 162 F. Supp. 206
(N.D. Cal. 1958); Tropp v. Tropp, 129 Cal. App. 62, 18 P.2d 385 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1933); Krupp
v. Felter, 191 Misc. 726, 77 N.Y.S.2d 665 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), af'd, 274 A.D. 761, 80 N.Y.S.2d 725
(1948); see also Swann, supra note 14, at 232 (concluding that pre-Code results were effectively
determined in drafting).
134. See In re Adams, 25 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1928) (contract to pay wife annuity nondischargeable maintenance, although debt could not be classified as alimony under state law when not part
of court decree and wife was ineligible for alimony because of marital fault); Egbers v. Northern
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25

gin in a property transaction taint the entire debt because courts would
except support-related provisions from discharge.135 And even though
an agreement exceeded the debtor's legal duty, courts nevertheless
could regard the agreement as a liquidation of his support obligation." 6
Other examples exist of the courts' liberal interpretation of the
bankruptcy statute in order to preserve debts that were directly related
to support. For instance, when debts owed to third parties originated
from the divorce action itself, in the form of attorney's fees or court
costs

s17

that the debtor had agreed or been ordered to pay, most courts

concluded that such obligations were actually in the nature of alimony. 3 8 Because attorney's fees were generally authorized by statute
and were awarded based on the same criteria as alimony, courts often
regarded such debts as equivalent to alimony and treated attorney's
fees the same as other allowances for necessaries. 3 9 Similarly, when the
post-divorce effect of the debt was to permit the former spouse or children to maintain their actual living expenses, even though payments
were not made directly to the dependent, many courts found them to
be nondischargeable forms of support by considering the actual function of the debt.14 0 Actual need-the evolving state-law standard for
setting support awards-relative to the parties' circumstances and
roughly defined by the doctrine of necessaries evolved as the basis for
evaluating nondischargeable divorce-related debts.
Pac. Ry., 98 Wash. 531, 167 P. 1073 (1917) (debtor's agreement to pay definite sum to former wife

held to be in the nature of alimony, despite divorce court's earlier refusal to modify because of its
conclusion that debt was part of property settlement).
135. See In re Avery, 114 F.2d 768 (6th Cir. 1940); In re Ridder, 79 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1935);
Battles v. Battles, 205 Okla. 587, 239 P.2d 794 (1952).
136. See In re Hollister, 47 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd, 132 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1943);
D'Andria v. Hageman, 253 A.D. 518, 2 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1938), aff'd, 278 N.Y. 630, 16 N.E.2d 294
(1938); Battles v. Battles, 205 Okla. 587, 239 P.2d 794 (1952).
137. Other than with respect to attorney's fees or court costs, however, debtors generally
continued to be relieved of liability for debts for predivorce goods or services supplied to dependents by third parties. See Schellenberg v. Mullaney, 112 A.D. 384, 98 N.Y.S. 432 (1906); Kanter v.
Crimmins, 87 Misc. 2d 647, 385 N.Y.S.2d 935 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
138. See In re Birdseye, 548 F.2d 321 (10th Cir. 1977); In re Jones, 518 F.2d 678 (9th Cir.
1975); In re Nunnally, 506 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Hargrove, 361 F. Supp. 851 (W.D. Mo.
1973).
139. See In re Gorski, 25 F. Supp. 551 (W.D.N.Y. 1938) (wife's attorney's fees equivalent to
maintenance and support and therefore not dischargeable); Merriman v. Hawbaker, 5 F. Supp. 432
(E.D. Il. 1934) (wife's attorney's fees equivalent to alimony and therefore not dischargeable);
Krupp v. Felter, 191 Misc. 726, 77 N.Y.S.2d 665 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), (attorney's fees obtained from
husband by wife's attorney in a separate action equivalent to support of wife and therefore not
dischargeable), aff'd, 274 A.D. 761, 80 N.Y.S.2d 725 (1948).
140. See Poolman v. Poolman, 289 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1961) (payments on mortgage in nature
of support and therefore not dischargeable); In re Gorski, 25 F. Supp. 551 (W.D.N.Y. 1938) (accrued interest on mortgage of realty transferred to wife nondischargeable); Nesbit v. Nesbit, 80
N.M. 294, 454 P.2d 776 (1969) (order to pay community debts in nature of alimony or support and
therefore not dischargeable).
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The result in an individual case, however, was not entirely predictable. Courts developed a confused and often contradictory body of case
law partly because of their failure to agree as to the underlying source
of applicable law. One line of cases, typified by In re Waller,"" looked
to the law of the state in which the obligation had arisen and classified
the obligation in the manner that the state court would have done, had
it been required to do so.'"2 This approach was expedient because

courts needed to consult only the alimony and support statutes and interpretive case law of a single jurisdiction to determine whether the
state court would have ordered support in the state divorce action. 143
Obviously, this approach treated debtors and their dependents differently under identical circumstances for the sole reason that they happened to live in different states."' Formality, therefore, could override
actual need.
Another line of cases developed that avoided the emphasis of form
over substance. In these cases the courts relied on support principles in
general, rather than the law of a particular state, to determine the underlying nature of a debt.'45 To classify an obligation under this approach, courts typically considered the traditional features of alimony,
such as termination of the obligation on death of either party or remarriage of the recipient or modifiability of the payment. 4 6 Often, these
courts would consider the parties' actual circumstances at the time the
debt was created to determine whether the debt fulfilled the function of
141. 494 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1974).
142. See Nitz v. Nitz, 568 F.2d 148 (10th Cir. 1977); In re Cox, 543 F.2d 1277 (10th Cir.
1976); In re Jones, 518 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1975); Hylek v. Hylek, 148 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1945);
Westmoreland v. Dodd, 2 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 267 U.S. 595 (1925); In re Alcorn,
162 F. Supp. 206 (N.D. Cal. 1958). Courts applied state law so predominantly that they often
regarded this approach as "uniform." See In re Shaver, 40 Bankr. 964 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1983), af'd,
736 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1984).
143. Although the result was consistent with Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
which required application of underlying state law in federal court diversity actions, the Erie doctrine does not apply in bankruptcy cases. See Fore Improvement Corp. v. Selig, 278 F.2d 143 (2d
Cir. 1960); see also Note, Indiana Divorce Law, supra note 14, at 391-94.
144. The result was particularly unfortunate when a dependent spouse did not qualify for
support because of strict state alimony statutes, especially when fault could constitute a complete
bar. For example, Indiana courts cannot award alimony agreed upon by the parties absent a written instrument reflecting the agreement. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-10(a) (Burns 1987). Moreover,
Indiana courts cannot award alimony absent a finding that the spouse requesting support possesses
a physical or mental handicap that renders the spouse incapable of self-support. Id. § 31-1-11.59(c); see In re Shaver, 40 Bankr. 964 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1983), af'd, 736 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1984).
145. See In re Nunnally, 506 F.2d 1024, 1027 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Shacter, 467 F. Supp. 64
(D. Md.), af'd, 610 F.2d 813 (4th Cir. 1979); In re Usher, 442 F. Supp. 866 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
146. See In re Melichar, 661 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1981) (decided under old bankruptcy law),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982); In re Shacter, 467 F. Supp. 64 (D. Md.), af'd, 610 F.2d 813 (4th
Cir. 1979); see also Eigenbrode v. Eigenbrode, 19 Md. App. 597, 313 A.2d 569 (1973).
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support.14 7 Although purporting to apply general family law doctrine,
these courts still reached unpredictable results because they could not
agree on the relevant features required to classify the debt as support.
Under both the specific state law and the general law approaches,
the appropriate criteria for determining the nature of a debt remained
uncertain. Courts in both types of jurisdictions developed various versions of an "intent" test, which focused on the express or implicit intention of the parties or the court that had created the obligation. 4 8
Disagreement existed as to whether that intention must be apparent
from the contract or decree itsef' 4 9 or whether court records regarding
its creation' 5" or relevant extrinsic evidence of the parties' circumstances could be considered.1 5 ' Furthermore, the exact nature of the
requisite intention was unclear. While some courts required a specific
intention to create a debt that would fulfill a defined state-law duty of
support, 5 " other courts required an intention to have the obligation fulfill the function of support. 53 Although these latter courts focused
more on the effect of the debt than on any explicit or implied intention,
they generally couched their decisions in intent language.
Thus, while state-law concepts of support concededly were important, few courts concurred as to the precise role of state law or the approach to be taken in classifying a particular debt. The courts focused
too extensively on the particulars of state law without evaluating the
underlying state-law concepts of support. Although definite patterns
had developed and various approaches had been formulated, the law
regarding dischargeability of divorce-related debts was far from uniform at the time Congress, in a major overhaul of American bankruptcy
147. See In re Smith, 436 F. Supp. 469 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Myhers v. Myhers, 6 Cal. App. 3d
855, 86 Cal. Rptr. 356 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) See generally Staggs, supra note 14, at 180-81
(discussing the nondischargeability of support debts in Texas, where no alimony authorized).
148. See Barth v. Barth, 448 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Mo. 1978), afl'd, 590 F.2d 340 (8th Cir.
1978); Sloan v. Mitchell, 28 Cal. App. 3d 47, 104 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1972). See generally Swann, supra
note 14 (providing a detailed analysis of pre-Code cases).
149. See Fernandes v. Pitta, 47 Cal. App. 2d 248, 250-51, 117 P.2d 728, 729-30 (1941);
Abrams v. Burg, 367 Mass. 617, 327 N.E.2d 745 (1975).
150. See In re Payne, 13 Bankr. 481 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1981); In re Allen, 4 Bankr. 617, 620
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980).
151. See Sloan v. Mitchell, 28 Cal. App. 3d 47, 104 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1972); see also In re
Smith, 436 F. Supp. 469, 475 (N.D. Ga. 1977); West v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 1102, 1106 (S.D.
Tex. 1971), afl'd, 477 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1973); Lyon v. Lyon, 115 Utah 466, 206 P.2d 148 (1949).
152. See In re Cornish, 529 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1976); Kadel v. Kadel, 21 Ohio Misc. 232, 250
N.E.2d 420 (Clark County Ct. C.P. 1969).
153. See Williams v. Department of Social & Health Servs. of Wash., 529 F.2d 1264, 1270-71
(9th Cir. 1976); Poolman v. Poolman, 289 F.2d 332, 335 (8th Cir. 1961); Henson v. Henson, 366
S.W.2d 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963); Erickson v. Beradall, 20 Utah 2d 287, 289-90, 437 P.2d 210, 212
(1968).
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law, enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.114
B. Development Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act
1. Section 523(a)(5)
The current Bankruptcy Code, 5 5 enacted in 1978, was the product
of a long legislative process and considerable compromise. 56 Section
523(a)(5), reinstating the exception from discharge for alimony, maintenance, and support, likewise was a compromise resolution of alternate
proposals.157 The final product retained the historical distinction between debts incurred pursuant to support obligations and those resulting from property divisions, because Congress expressly rejected
58
proposals that would have eliminated the distinction.1
Section 523(a)(5) is narrower than its predecessor in some respects
by limiting nondischargeability to only those support-related debts "to
a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor"' 5 that arose "in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a
court of record,

. . .

or property settlement agreement."' 60 Thus, some
6

support payments remain dischargeable regardless of their character.'1

154. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1982)).
155. Id.
156. For thorough accounts of the legislative process and alternative proposals, see M. VOGES
& K. SHIMPOCK,THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978 (1981); Bare, The Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978, 47 TENN. L. REV. 501 (1980); Kennedy, Foreword: A Brief History of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act, 58 N.C.L. REv. 667 (1980); King, The Code: Adding up the Changes, 5 FAM. ADvoc.,
Winter 1983, At 2; Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Code, 54 AM. BANKr L.J. 275
(1980); Pickard, The New Bankruptcy Code, Part I: A Review of Some of the Significant Changes
in Bankruptcy Law, 10 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 177 (1980).
157. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 364, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS, 5963, 6320; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 5787, 5865.
158. Senate Debate on Compromise Bill, 124 CONG. REc. H1164-66 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978);
Id. at H11,096 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards); Id. at S17,412 (daily ed. Oct.
6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini).
159. 11 U.S.C.S. § 523(a)(5) (Law. Coop. 1986 & Supp. 1987). Thus, for instance, "palimony"
payments ordered payable to a nonmarital cohabitant do not fit within the exception. See In re
Marcus, 45 Bankr. 338, 342 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
160. 11 U.S.C.S. § 523(a)(5) (Law. Coop. Supp. 1987). A 1984 amendment, Pub. L. No. 98353, added the language "or other order of a court of record," clarifying that predivorce support

awards and awards unrelated to divorce actions, such as judgments in paternity suits, also are
nondischargeable. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (Supp. III 1985).

161.

See In re Marino, 29 Bankr. 797 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983) (order to reimburse county

when child made ward of county not within enumerated types of agreements under original statutory exception and thus dischargeable). But see In re Shine, 57 Bankr. 386 (Bankr. D.N.H.) (consent order reducing separate maintenance arrearages to lump sum and vacating support order
nondischargeable despite fact that order was not "in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or property settlement"), affd, 802 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1986); DuPhily v. DuPhily, 52
Bankr. 971 (Bankr. D. Del. 1985) (discharge of child support arrearages for illegitimate child not
"in connection with" appropriate instrument violates equal protection clause); Oregon v. Richards,
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Furthermore, section 523(a)(5)(A) requires discharge when the "debt is
assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of law, or otherwise," except for assignments to specified governmental entities.16
Most importantly, and least clearly, section 523(a)(5)(B) specifies
that the language of the creating instrument will not control classification for dischargeability purposes; rather, the liability must be "actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.' 16 3 Congress
indicated that in determining the actual nature of a debt, courts should
apply federal, rather than state, law.'" Unfortunately, Congress provided few additional clues as to how the judiciary was to develop that
underlying body of federal law of support.
While the statutory language and legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 make clear that much of the judicial precedent created under the former Bankruptcy Act would be
inapplicable, 6 5 early commentary suggested that the new provision was
substantively a reenactment of its predecessor and predicted that section 523(a)(5) would effect little change. 6 6 Such predictions have
proved correct in one sense: the confusion, disagreement, and controversy over the appropriate method of determining the nature of a divorce-related debt, and thereby its status for the purpose of
discharge, 67 has continued. Although the courts, to some extent, have
45 Bankr. 811 (Bankr. D. Or. 1984) (child support obligation owed directly to state nondischargeable because of policy reasons for statutory exception, although debt not "in connection with"
listed types of agreements or orders).
162. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(A), in its original form, excepted specified support-related debts
from discharge, "but not to the extent that-(A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of law, or otherwise." The 1981 amendment, Pub. L. No. 97-35, qualified the
assignment subsection (A) to add "(other than debts assigned pursuant to section 402(a)(26) of the
Social Security Act)." The 1984 amendment, Pub. L. No. 98-353, further added "or any such debt
which has been assigned to the Federal government or to a State or any political subdivision of
such State" to the type of permissible assignees.
163. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(B) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (emphasis added).
164. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 364, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6320.
165. The congressional reports state that "cases such as In re Waller, 494 F.2d 447 (6th Cir.
1974) ... are overruled." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 364, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6320; S.REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprintedin 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787, 5865. See supra text accompanying notes 141-44, for discussion
of the Waller line of cases.
166. See, e.g., Note, Dischargeabilityof Divorce-Related Expenses, supra note 14, at 806
(indicating that "[a]lIthough section 523(a)(5) has not changed prior bankruptcy law dramatically,
the changes that have resulted are important"); see also Comment, Dischargeabilityof Obligations, supra note 14.
167. Classification of family-related debts is important in other bankruptcy contexts as well.
For example, alimony, maintenance, and support payments are exempt property under 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(d)(10)(D), and the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362 does not affect the collection of these
payments.
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refined the variations of the "intent" tests developed under prior law 168
and have resolved some of the issues necessary to establish a cohesive
debt classification standard, the courts have not developed a uniform
approach for isolating the precise criteria that should be applied in categorizing debts as "actually in the nature of alimony, support, or
maintenance.' ' 6 9
2. Interpretation of the Code
The early cases interpreting the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 differed
little from those decided under the prior law. 170 Many courts continued
to use an ad hoc approach by classifying an individual debt on the basis
of whether it resembled traditional state court alimony.17 ' Thus, if a
debt were payable in installments over a long or indefinite period of
time and terminated upon the death or remarriage of the former
spouse, courts most likely would classify the debt as nondischargeable
support. 72
The courts generally placed considerable significance on the lan74
guage of the creating instrument. 73 For example, in Stout v. Prusse'
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the bankruptcy
court had not grossly abused its discretion by looking "solely at the
property settlement as a whole" to determine that a debt was dischargeable. 75 The Ninth Circuit found significant the fact that other
provisions of the agreement were designated support and terminated
upon specific dates or events. 70 Many courts applied traditional rules
of construction,'" but disagreed as to the admissibility of extrinsic evi168. See supra text accompanying notes 148-53.
169. See Freeburger & Bowles, supra note 14, at 600-13 (detailing five general categories of
tests used to identify support obligations for bankruptcy purposes: state law standards, factors
tests, intent tests, facts and circumstances tests, and the Calhoun doctrine).

170. See Comment, Dischargeabilityof Obligations,supra note 14, at 531-34 (comparing
cases under old Act and new Code).
171. See In re Catlow, 663 F.2d 960, 962 (9th Cir. 1981); In re Lasher, 20 Bankr. 543, 545
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982); In re Ingram, 5 Bankr. 232, 234 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
172. See In re Wesley, 36 Bankr. 526 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983); In re Rachmiel, 19 Bankr. 721
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982); In re Newman, 15 Bankr. 67 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981); In re Henry, 5
Bankr. 342 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980).
173. See In re Alloway, 37 Bankr. 420, 424-25 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); In re Wiley, 27 Bankr.
21, 23 (Bankr. D. Or. 1982); In re Kaplan, 18 Bankr. 1018 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Eisenberg,
18 Bankr. 1001, 1003 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982); cf. In re Demkow, 8 Bankr. 554 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1983) (court must examine debts designated as support but may not examine those labeled property settlement).
174. 691 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1982).
175. Id. at 861.
176. Id.
177. See In re Wah Chin, 3 B.C.D. 1363 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1978) and cases cited therein,
cited in In re Warner, 5 Bankr. 434 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980).
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dence. 178 Responding to widespread criticism that the focus on the verbal formulation of the debt emphasized form over substance and
ignored the statutory language, 17 9 courts attempted to formulate a more

precise and consistent test to determine when a debt should be classified as support, and therefore be nondischargeable under section
523(a)(5).
Most bankruptcy and appellate courts continued to apply some variation of an "intent" test, which was developed under the old bankruptcy law. 180 In most cases, however, no express intention was
apparent from the relevant documents, and the parties' testimony with
respect to their original intentions generally conflicted.18 And, as was
the case before enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, courts remained uncertain as to the precise nature of the relevant intent and
mechanically applied a somewhat standard list of factors deemed to indicate whether the parties intended a debt to provide support. 18 2 Such
an intent test provided no real test at all, because its reasoning was
circular: if a debt is "actually in the nature" of support, the parties
intended it to act as support, and the parties' intentions must be determined by the "actual nature" of the debt.
For example, in In re Coil"" the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit approved the bankruptcy court's application of an intent test to
determine the dischargeability of a debtor's agreement to hold his former wife harmless from marital debts owed to third party creditors.
Without discussing the establishment of a federal standard, the appellate court held that the intentions of the parties controlled as to
178. Compare In re Kagan, 42 Bankr. 563 (Bankr. N.D. I1. 1984) (bankruptcy court must
examine document providing award); In re Story, 36 Bankr. 546 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983) (obligations in form of alimony nondischargeable, although label not controlling); In re Kaplan, 18 Bankr.

1018 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Eisenberg, 18 Bankr. 1001 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (court must
consider parties' stipulation as a whole to determine intent); Harbour v. Harbour, 590 S.W.2d 838
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (order of divorce court must be examined to determine dischargeability)
with In re Miller, 34 Bankr. 289, 292 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983) (extrinsic evidence of intention should
be considered along with document); In re Smotherman, 30 Bankr. 568, 570 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1983) (court must look beyond four corners of instrument); In re Thomas, 21 Bankr. 571, 573
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (same); In re Ingram, 5 Bankr. 232, 234 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (extrinsic
evidence may be considered to uncover ambiguities).
179. See In re Story, 36 Bankr. 546, 549 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983) (mere denomination not
determinative); In re Wesley, 36 Bankr. 526, 529 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) (intent and circumstances of creation prevail over labels).
180. See Melichar v. Ost, 661 F.2d 300, 303 (4th Cir. 1981) (although state law important
factor in determining parties' intent, agreement may be hybrid and combination does not necessarily destroy nature of payment), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1981); In re Cowley, 35 Bankr. 520,
522-23 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983); In re Hawkins, 25 Bankr. 430, 434-35 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982).
181. See, e.g., In re Warner, 5 Bankr. 434 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980).
182. See In re Wesley, 36 Bankr. 526, 529 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983); In re Wolfe, 26 Bankr.
781 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982).
183. 680 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1982).
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whether a debt would be considered part of a support allowance or, instead, as an allocation of marital property.18 4 The Coil court held that
the bankruptcy court's determination was not clearly erroneous in light
of the former wife's testimony that she had agreed to reduced child
support payments because of the hold harmless agreement.1 8 Therefore, the debt functioned as support because discharge of the debt
would decrease the wife's ability to support the children. Thus, Coil
suggested a formulation of a federal standard that considered the purpose of the parties' original agreement, which was discernible from the
practical function of the debt. 88
The intent test gradually evolved into an "effect" or "function"
test. In many jurisdictions courts began searching for the purpose of
effectively providing a source of support for dependents, rather than
examining the intended use of the actual, specific funds supplied by
payment of the debt. A finding that the parties had created a debt as a
substitute for support determined the outcome in many cases. For example, in In re Troup 87 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy and district court decisions that a hold harmless
agreement for all marital debts was nondischargeable. In seeking the
184. Id. at 1172. To -determine that intent, the court suggested that the bankruptcy court
look for the types of factors set out in In re Woods, 561 F.2d 27 (7th Cir. 1977), a pre-Code
decision. Those factors included, among others, direct payments to the former spouse, indications
of an intention "to balance the relative incomes of the parties," the placement of the hold harmless
clause among either support or property provisions, and a description of the type and method of
debt payment assumed by the spouse. Coil, 680 F.2d at 1172.
185. 680 F.2d at 1172.
186. Cf. Shaver v. Shaver, 736 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1984). In Shaver the initial divorce decree
provided that the husband would pay the wife, in addition to child support, $150,000 "in settlement of [the wife's] property rights," payable at $2000 a month for seventy-five months. Id. at
1315. After negotiations between the couple, the divorce court further amended the decree to
award the wife $197,300 over a ten-year period, and referred to the debt as her "marital and dower
rights," ending on her death during the ten-year period. The amendment allowed the husband to
deduct the payments from his federal income tax; the wife's additional amount represented the
sum that she would pay as taxes. In the husband's subsequent bankruptcy action, the bankruptcy
court concluded that the debt was in the nature of support.
On appeal, the district court held that the parties intended the payment as support, In re
Shaver, 40 Bankr. 964 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1983), and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Shaver, 736 F.2d
at 1314. The appellate court focused largely on the absence of other spousal provisions in the
decree and the wife's status at the time of divorce as an unemployed, unskilled woman with three
minor children in her custody, while the husband owned a business that produced a substantial
income. Although the divorce court initially had labeled the award a property division, it had
considered the parties' economic circumstances, which the Court of Appeals found to be irrelevant
to a true property settlement but of primary importance to a settlement intended for support. Id.
at 1316-17. The Ninth Circuit noted that the amended divorce decree spread out the payments for
a longer time and provided that the payments were to cease upon the wife's death within that
period. Thus, in applying an intent test, the Ninth Circuit considered the parties' actual circumstances to determine if the debt functioned as support. Id. at 1317.
187. 730 F.2d 464 (6th Cir. 1984).
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intent of the parties and the purpose of the agreement, the lower courts
found that the wife's agreement not to seek alimony, but rather to accept the property settlement in lieu of alimony, was itself in the nature
of support and not a waiver of support. Furthermore, the bankruptcy
court credited the wife's testimony that she had agreed to lower child
support payments in consideration of her former husband's agreement
to assume their debts: "It is clear that this particular provision reflects
the intent of the parties to have defendant pay the mutual debts in
substitution of alimony or child support."' " Thus, the purpose and
function of the obligation provided the basis of nondischargeability,
rather than the form of the debt itself.
Although courts continued to use the language of the intent test,
courts shifted their focus to an analysis of the practical effect of the
debt on the dependent. In In re Williams"1 9 the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit applied such a version of the intent test to affirm the
bankruptcy court's determination that debts assumed by the former
husband payable to banks, finance companies, department stores, and
an order to pay his wife's attorney's fees, were nondischargeable. The
court looked to the function of the debts and found that, because the
purpose of the underlying expenditures was to furnish "necessities and
ordinary staples of everyday life,"1 10 the husband intended the obligations as support for the wife. Likewise, a 15,000 dollar sum, payable to
the wife in monthly installments of 300 dollars, reasonably could have
been intended to assist the wife in meeting her living expenses, although the obligation was originally labeled part of a "property settlement" to prevent modification under state law. 191 Although unclear
from the parties' separation agreement incorporated in their Missouri
divorce decree, the husband's intention to support his wife was evident
from the wife's extrinsic evidence of her poor health and the amount of
her living expenses, which greatly exceeded her monthly income. Although the husband presented evidence that attorney's fees were not
considered support under Missouri law, 92 the court found that, in light
of the wife's circumstances, the parties intended the payments to function as support, especially since the attorney's fees were to be paid di188. Id. at 466 (quoting bankruptcy court's conclusion of law).
189. 703 F.2d 1055 (8th Cir. 1983).
190. Id. at 1057 (quoting In re Jensen, 17 Bankr. 537, 540 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982), which
cited Poolman v. Poolman, 289 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1961)). The debts assumed by the husband in
Williams had been "incurred to purchase farm equipment, furniture, clothing, appliances, and the
like." 703 F.2d at 1057.
191. 703 F.2d at 1057.
192. Id. Although the Williams court stated that it would regard state law with deference,

the court distinguished the husband's Missouri authority and indicated that it was not bound by
such authority in any event. Id. at 1057-58.
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rectly to the wife who would remain liable if the debt were
discharged." 3 The court looked strictly to the underlying effect of the
debts and disregarded their classification by the state court and the
parties' agreement. By shifting the focus of the inquiry to the function
of the debt, the court emphasized the actual needs of the dependent.
a definition of
Williams thus illustrates a movement toward recognizing
1 4
doctrine.
necessaries
the
to
support that corresponds
Despite the evolution of the intent test into a "function" or "effect" standard, the federal appellate courts have articulated relatively
few definitive and comprehensive statements to guide bankruptcy
courts in classifying debts under section 523(a)(5).195 The lower courts
continue to reach inconsistent and unpredictable results, and divorce
planning to accommodate the contingency of bankruptcy remains a
risky venture.
Much of the disorder could be reduced, if not eliminated, if courts
were thoroughly to consider the concept of support in contemporary
family law and acknowledge that support is a relative concept as defined under the necessaries doctrine. When courts define support in relative terms, according to the parties' standard of living, courts can
apply that definition to resolve the remaining areas of dispute. These
areas of dispute include the following: (1) the extent to which indirect
support payments, although payable to a party other than a spouse or
193. Id. at 1057 n.3. The court commented that the fact that the payment was owed to the
wife, and not the attorney, prevented the payment from being classified as an assignment under
§ 523(a)(5)(A).
194. Id. at 1056-58. Relying on Williams, the Eighth Circuit again recognized the role of
relative need with respect to child support in applying a "function" test in Boyle v. Donovan, 724
F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1984). The debtor in Boyle sought to discharge an obligation created in a property settlement agreement, incorporated into their Arkansas divorce decree, to pay college and
professional school expenses for his two sons after they reached the age of majority. Despite the
father's lack of a post-majority continuing duty under Arkansas law to support the children or to
pay for their education, the court held that the function of the debt was as a support mechanism.
Support was what the parties had intended. At the time of the agreement's execution, the debtor

had a substantial income, his former wife was a student, and the debtor himself had suggested
inclusion of the provision, which provided for his financing of a post-graduate degree as well as a
college education for his sons. The facts indicated that the parties considered such expenses part
of the "family pattern of life," and, therefore, the expenses were in the nature of support. Id. at
682-83. The court stated that the federal bankruptcy fresh start policy "must give way before the
rights [the debtor] recognized to provide his children with a start in life comparable to that which
he enjoyed." Id. at 683.
195. One reason for the paucity of appellate guidance is the standard for appellate review.
Bankruptcy Rule 8013 authorizes reversal of bankruptcy court determinations of facts only if the
decision of the lower court is clearly erroneous. Even within particular jurisdictions the results
under the clearly erroneous standard have been divergent. For example, in Stout v. Prussell, 691
F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), the Ninth Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court classification

based solely on the language of a separation agreement. Two years later that same court approved
examination of any relevant extrinsic evidence, without reference to its earlier decision. See Shaver
v. Shaver, 736 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1984).
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child, may escape discharge; (2) the proper role of state law in formulating a federal bankruptcy definition of support; and (3) the proper
method of analyzing an individual debt to determine its "actual" nature. Alternatively stated, courts must initially resolve the first two
threshold issues. Then courts can clarify and define the type of debt
that survives discharge under section 523(a)(5) by identifying the factors relevant to testing an individual debt for the appropriate attributes
of support. Because of a failure to segregate these distinct questions,
the decisions have been inconsistent and the results unpredictable. In
In re Calhoun,9 ' however, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
provided a structure for resolving these continuing controversies in a
manner consistent with prevailing state family law concepts of support.
3.

The Calhoun Approach

Calhoun presented the Sixth Circuit with the recurring problem of
determining whether the bankruptcy court had properly categorized
post-marital debts for dischargeability purposes. The debtor in Calhoun had assumed five loans pursuant to a separation agreement with
his former wife, whom he had agreed to hold harmless. 197 The bankruptcy court decided that the assumption was nondischargeable and
held that the language of the parties' agreement, which characterized
the assumption as support,' controlled "unless the compelling weight
of the evidence suggests that enforcement of the agreement would work
a manifest injustice."' 99 The court required the debtor spouse to prove
that the agreement would work such an injustice or that the language
meant something other than what it said.
In rejecting the bankruptcy court's decision, the Sixth Circuit critiqued the existing approaches for determining dischargeability of divorce-related debts and clarified the threshold issues regarding indirect
support payments and the appropriate role of state law. The court systematically formulated a three-step test for analyzing individual debts,
which considered intent, effect, and reasonableness.
Before applying its three-step test, the Calhoun court addressed
the first threshold issue concerning the dischargeability of indirect sup196. 715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983).
197. The expenses for which the debts had been incurred included construction of a swimming pool at the home owned by the wife, a loan to consolidate the couple's prior debts, various
charge card accounts related to the debtor's vocational training and business, and a vehicle titled
to the debtor. The court properly distinguished the underlying debts owed to the couple's creditors
from the obligation to the wife as evidenced by the hold harmless agreement, recognizing that only
the latter was at issue. Id. at 1106 & n.4.
198. "The agreement characterizes this assumption as alimony and support although it is
found in the section of the document labeled Division of Property." Id. at 1105.
199. Id. at 1111.
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port payments. The Calhoun court concluded that, in light of the legislative history of section 523(a)(5)200 and earlier appellate court
decisions,2 01 a debt need not be payable directly to the former spouse in
order to escape discharge. Bankruptcy courts uniformly have included
hold harmless agreements, like direct support obligations, within the
support exception.120
After addressing the dischargeability of indirect support payments,
the court discussed the second threshold issue: the extent to which federal courts should utilize or consult state law in creating the federal law
of support. Noting that the legislative history of section 523(a)(5)
clearly required application of federal law, rather than state law, the
court nevertheless reasoned that the latter could not be ignored, because a support obligation arises only under state law.103 Although most
courts used state law as a source of judicial guidance, no consensus existed as to how the federal courts should utilize state law and the extent
to which they should rely upon it. The Calhoun court adopted the principle that state-law concepts of support in general, rather than the law
of any individual state, should provide the basis for the federal standard. In determining whether a loan assumption was meant as a substitute for support payments or was merely a method of dividing property
at divorce, the appropriate federal test, according to the Calhoun court,
is one based on "those factors most often considered relevant by state
courts generally in determining whether to grant support without reference to any particular state's law."' 0
After resolving these two preliminary issues, the court addressed
the ultimate question of determining the nature of a specific debt. The
essential problem, according to the Calhoun court, is that one spouse's
assumption of a joint obligation always will contribute, at least indirectly, to the other spouse's support. This support contribution occurs
even if the debt arose from a property division, since the assumption
05
frees additional funds that the one spouse may then use for support.
A refusal of discharge based solely on that rationale would thwart bankruptcy law's fresh start doctrine, which courts must consider in any in200.

Id. at 1106 (citing S.

REP.

No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprintedin 1978 US. CODE

CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5865; H.R. REP. No.
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 6320).

595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 364, reprintedin 1978

201. Id. at 1106-07 (citing In re Spong, 661 F.2d 6 (2d Cir, 1981); In re Petoske, 16 Bankr.
412 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Gentile, 16 Bankr. 381 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); In re French, 9

Bankr. 464, 466-67 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981)).
202. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1107.
203.
204.
205.

Id.
Id. at 1108.
Id.
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quiry regarding dischargeability. 0 8 Therefore, the fact that a debt
furnishes some degree of support should not determine classification for
bankruptcy purposes. In Calhoun the Sixth Circuit developed a threestep test to resolve this dilemma.
First, according to the Calhoun court, when classifying any divorcerelated debt, a court must discern an intention of the state divorce
court, or of the parties themselves, to create a support obligation. The
court may find that intention by considering any relevant evidence, including the traditional criteria used by state courts in awarding support.20 7 If the requisite intent is absent, the inquiry ends, and the debt
is dischargeable.
Once the court has found an intent to create a support obligation,
the second inquiry is to determine if the assumption of liability "has
the effect of providing the support necessary to ensure that the daily
needs of the former spouse and any children of the marriage are satisfied. '20 8 If the spouse has independent assets, acquired through a property settlement or otherwise, the assumption of liability may not be
required for maintaining actual and immediate needs. The practical effect on the spouse's ability for self-support, in terms of "daily necessities" absent the assumption of liability, is the key criterion. 20 9 Under
Calhoun's second step, therefore, support means the amount intended
and actually required to provide for the dependents' means of survival.
Once the intent and effect tests are met, Calhoun's third step requires a court to determine the reasonableness of the amount of support provided by the debt assumption in order to accommodate
bankruptcy's fresh start policy. This step entails balancing the needs of
the former spouse against the debtor's ability to pay-"[a] universal
consideration of state courts. '210 By applying factors similar to those
typically employed by state courts,2 ' the bankruptcy court must determine a "reasonable limit" on support, which involves consideration of
the debtor's "present and foreseeable ability to pay"21 2 at the time he
assumed liability. Any amount exceeding that ability to pay would not
be classified as support because otherwise the agreement would effectively constitute an illegal contracting away of the right to discharge in
bankruptcy.21 ' Furthermore, according to the Calhoun court, if the
206. Id. at 1109.
207. Id.
208. Id. (emphasis in original).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1110. The Calhoun court's statement suggests that courts should apply the same
analysis to direct support obligations as well as debt assumptions.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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debtor's circumstances have changed since the time of the initial agreement to the extent that the amount of support is currently inequitable,
the court may consider his current ability to pay "insofar as it relates to
the continuing obligation to assume the joint debts.

'2 14

The Sixth Cir-

cuit remanded the case for consideration of each of the individual loan
assumptions under this three-prong test. The Sixth Circuit also reminded the lower court that the burden of proof with respect to nondischargeability remains on the debtor's former spouse, not the debtor,
and that general equitable considerations are not relevant apart from
their role in the third step.
To date, Calhoun represents the most thorough and thoughtful attempt to articulate a test to determine the nature of a divorce-related
debt for bankruptcy purposes. Commentators have hailed Calhoun as a
"landmark decision that has significantly altered the bankruptcy court's
role involving domestic relations issues. '21' Although not without its
critics or inherent problems, Calhoun provides an "elegant formulation"216 and long-needed structure for resolving dischargeability issues.
The Calhoun court expressly limited its decision to analysis of loan
assumptions and their associated hold harmless agreements; however,
the case provides a useful framework for categorizing all types of divorce-related debts. Courts can use the Calhoun approach, modified to
accommodate the notion of support as a relative concept, to establish a
uniform federal structure for classification of commonly encountered
obligations that is consistent with currently accepted state family law
principles. The remainder of this Article analyzes, critiques, and reformulates the Calhoun approach in an attempt to resolve the two threshold issues-i.e., the dischargeability of indirect support payments and
the role of state law in the formulation of a federal standard of support-as well as to articulate the ultimate test for determining the nature of an individual debt.

214. Id. at 1110 n.11 (emphasis in original). The court cautioned, however, that a bankruptcy
court should not sit as a "super-divorce court"; rather, it should adjust the amount of support
representing the loan assumption only when the amount would "clearly exceed that which might
reasonably have been awarded as support by a state court after an adversarial proceeding." Id. at
1110 n.12.
215.

Weintraub & Resnick, From the Bankruptcy Courts, 18 U.C.C. L.J. 272, 275 (1986).

216. In re Helm, 48 Bankr. 215, 216 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.), afi'd, 49 Bankr. 573 (Bankr. W.D.
Ky. 1985).
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RESOLVING THE CONFLICTS

A. Indirect Support Payments
When divorce-related debts are payable directly to a spouse or
child, the bankruptcy court immediately can proceed to determine
whether those debts are in the nature of support and are thereby nondischargeable. Frequently, however, the debtor will have agreed to or
been ordered to make payments to a third party, which raises a preliminary question of whether a debt owed to someone other than a spouse,
former spouse, or child still may be exempt from discharge under section 523(a)(5). The identity of the payee should be irrelevant when support is defined in terms of the payment's effect on the dependent's
ability to satisfy relative need. Thus, Calhoun's conclusion that hold
harmless agreements may constitute nondischargeable support should
extend to other types of third party obligations as well, although the
issue remains partially unsettled.
1. Assigned Support Debts
The dispute over dischargeability of debts owed to third parties initially centered on the interpretation of section 523(a)(5)(A), which provides that debts assigned voluntarily, involuntarily, or by operation of
law, to another entity are dischargeable.2 17 The original language of that
provision, which contained no exceptions, along with the legislative history of the subsection,2 18 led many courts to conclude that only direct
payments to a dependent could escape discharge. 21 9 Early cases interpreted section 523(a)(5)(A) to apply primarily or exclusively to assignments to governmental entities when assignment was required as a
condition for receipt of certain public assistance funds. 220 The legisla217. 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(5)(A) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
218. Both the Senate and House Reports state that the language of § 523(a)(5), "in combination with the repeal of section 456(b) of the Social Security Act (43 U.S.C. 656(b)) ... will apply to
make nondischargeable only alimony, maintenance, or support owed directly to a spouse or dependent." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5787, 5865; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 364, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 6320.
219. See, e.g., In re Edwards, 31 Bankr. 113 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983); In re Drumheller, 13
Bankr. 707 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981); In re Daiker, 5 Bankr. 348 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980).
220. See, e.g., In re Glidden, 653 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1981) (upholding constitutionality of discharge provision), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982); In re Marino, 29 Bankr. 797 (N.D. Ind. 1983)
(exceptions to discharge strictly construed; debts dischargeable unless specifically excepted); In re
Deblock, 11 Bankr. 51 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981); In re French, 9 Bankr. 464 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1981); In re Wells, 8 Bankr. 189 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981); see also Franklin v. New Mexico, 730 F.2d
86 (10th Cir. 1984) (law at time of filing applies); In re Reynolds, 726 F.2d 1420 (9th Cir. 1984)

(original statutory provision permitted discharge, but law at time of decision controls); accord In
re Blair, 538 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1976); In re Roedel, 34 Bankr. 689 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1983), aff'd
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tive history supported this result;2 21 in fact, the Bankruptcy Reform Act
repealed a portion of the Social Security Act that had declared such
assignments nondischargeable in bankruptcy. 222 Since the purpose of
the exception is to protect dependents, some courts further reasoned
that only direct payments could escape discharge because no reason exstart policy if dependents did not
isted for thwarting bankruptcy's fresh
223
benefit directly from the payment.
The incongruity of relieving a debtor of his duty of support because
another entity stepped in to assist dependents who may be particularly
needy due to the debtor's breach, and the importance of protecting society from fulfilling the debtor's support obligations,2 24 led Congress to
amend section 523(a)(5)(A) in 1981 and again in 1984.225 The amended
provision authorizes the recipient to assign support payments to specified governmental entities when assignment is required for the receipt
of certain public assistance benefits. 226 Current application of section
523(a)(5)(A) thus is limited to assignments to parties other than those
authorized by the Code.
Although some controversy continues over the effect of section
523(a)(5)(A),227 most courts narrowly construe the meaning of the term
"assigned." Under this construction, the discharge of debts under section 523(a)(5)(A) would occur only when the recipient expressly has
transferred a direct support payment to another party,22s but not when
the court or debtor originally created the debt in favor of a third party.
Even when an actual assignment has been effected, a number of courts
have rejected application of the provision when the assignment is solely
for the purpose of collection. 229 The application of section 523(a)(5)(A)
mem., 734 F.2d 5 (3d Cir. 1984).
221. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5865; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 364, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6320.
222. Prior 42 U.S.C. § 656(b), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
223. See In re Dirks, 15 Bankr. 775 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981).
224. See In re Reynolds, 726 F.2d 1420 (9th Cir. 1984); see also In re Stovall, 721 F.2d 1133
(7th Cir. 1983)(amendment applies to arrearages and future support).
225. Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981); Pub. L. No. 98-353 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
226. Id.
227. See In re Ramirez, 795 F.2d 1494, 1499 (9th Cir. 1986) (Ferguson, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 1624 (1987).
228. See In re Edwards, 31 Bankr. 113 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983); In re Reichurdt, 27 Bankr.
751 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983); In re Lang, 11 Bankr. 428 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981).
229. See In re Daumit, 25 Bankr. 371 (Bankr. D. Md. 1982) (court-ordered attorney's fees
payable to spouse, who assigned to law firm presumably to facilitate collection, held nondischargeable); In re Auer, 22 Bankr. 274 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (same); In re Deblock, 11 Bankr. 51
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981) (assignment for collection only not dischargeable). But see In re Crawford, 8 Bankr. 552 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981) (court-ordered attorney's fees payable to wife dischargea-
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only in cases when a dependent will not benefit from continuation of
the debt because of its transfer to a non-protected party is consistent
with the purpose of excepting from discharge those debts that actually
function as support for dependents.
2. Payments to Third Parties
Irrespective of section 523(a)(5)(A), however, the result in an individual case still may turn on the identity of the recipient, rather than
the substance of the debt, despite a dependent's continued benefit from
nondischarge. For purposes of comparing and contrasting bankruptcy
court treatment of third party debts, such debts can be grouped into
three general categories: (1) obligations to pay future expenses of dependents; (2) assumptions of debts incurred jointly during marriage;
and (3) obligations to pay third parties for expenses or costs arising
from divorce. Separate analysis of these three categories leads to the
conclusion that, if a consistent policy-based result is to be reached, the
underlying nature of the debts should control classification, rather than
the identity of the person or entity designated to receive the actual
payment.
a. Future Expenses
Pursuant to divorce, a debtor frequently will be ordered or will
contract to make specified future payments to third parties for the benefit of the former spouse or children. Such obligations often include
medical, educational, and insurance expenses, as well as payment of
specified living costs, such as rent, mortgage payments, and utility bills.
In this context, courts generally disregard the fact that the actual recipient of the payments is not a dependent under the statutory terms. 3 0 If
the debtor incurred the obligation for traditional types of supportrelated goods or services-health, education, housing, and the
like-courts likely will proceed directly to the classification stage regardless of the payee's identity.2 3 ' The majority of courts interpret the
ble when assigned to attorney).
230.

See In re Holt, 40 Bankr. 1009 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1984). But see In re Daiker, 5 Bankr.

348, 352-53 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980) (debt must be owed directly to spouse).
231. See In re Thomas, 21 Bankr. 571 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (mortgage payments assumed
under property settlement nondischargeable); In re Hughes, 16 Bankr. 90 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1981)
(debtor's agreement to pay second mortgage and hospital bill constitutes support); In re

Stranathan, 15 Bankr. 223 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1981) (second mortgage payments held, with no discussion, to be in nature of support); In re Lineberry, 9 Bankr. 700 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981) (obligation

to pay life insurance on own life constitutes support); In re Tope, 7 Bankr. 422 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1980) (obligation to pay mortgage payments, utilities, telephone bills, real estate taxes, and insurance on home nondischargeable). This disregard for the payee's identity is particularly evident
when the payments benefit the debtor's minor children. See, e.g., In re Holt, 40 Bankr. 1009
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statutory language, which excepts from discharge support debts "to" a
qualified dependent, to read "for the benefit of" that dependent. 32 The
result is indisputably correct; it would be illogical to demand that payments for essentials flow through the dependent's hands in order to
constitute support for bankruptcy purposes.
b. Assumptions
The courts have been less disposed to disregard the recipient's
identity when the spouses jointly incurred the obligation during marriage, but the debtor assumed full responsibility for repayment on divorce. Although assumptions of liabilities differ from obligations to pay
future expenses because they are collateral obligations owed directly to
the spouse for past, as opposed to future, goods or services, assumptions
may overlap with future expense obligations to the extent that both
types of debt may involve similar underlying expenses, such as mortgage payments, educational expenses, or medical expenses.2 s The distinctive feature of an assumption of liability is the continuing legal
obligation of the former spouse to the joint creditor irrespective of the
debtor's assumption; the assumption is a secondary agreement that
does not alter the underlying obligation to the third party creditor.2 34
Absent the creditor's release of the spouse, the assumption merely indemnifies the spouse.
When the hold harmless agreement is express, courts have little
difficulty concluding that the debtor may not be relieved of continuing
liability to the spouse simply because the underlying debt is owed to a
third party.23 5 As the Calhoun court noted in reaching this result,236 the
House and Senate reports indicated that Congress did not intend for
hold harmless agreements to be discharged if the agreement was actually in the nature of support.3 7 Accordingly, courts are virtually unani(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1984) (mortgage payments and payments for children's medical and dental bills);
In re Growney, 15 Bankr. 849 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981) (medical, dental, optical, and prescription
expenses for children nondischargeable, although not payable directly to wife or children).
232. See, e.g., In re Holt, 40 Bankr. 1009 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1984).
233. See Annotation, Debts for Alimony, Maintenance, and Support as Exceptions to Bankruptcy Discharge, Under § 523(a)(5) of Bankruptcy Code of 1978, 69 A.L.R. Fed. 403 (1984 &
Supp. 1986) (cases grouped according to type of underlying obligation).
234. See generally Robbins, Advantages of a Timely Bankruptcy, 5 FAM. ADvoc., Winter
1983, at 14; Shiffer, supra note 8, at 9.
235. See In re Williams, 703 F.2d 1055, 1057 (8th Cir. 1983) (critical issue is function); In re
Sledge, 47 Bankr. 349, 352 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981) (hold harmless agreement "in lieu of alimony" is
nondischargeable support); In re French, 19 Bankr. 255 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982).
236. In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103, 1106 (6th Cir. 1983).

237. The House Report stated:
This provision will, however, make nondischargeable any debts resulting from an agreement

by the debtor to hold the debtor's spouse harmless on joint debts, to the extent that the
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mous in treating a hold harmless agreement the same as a direct
obligation." 8
Calhoun expressly limited its analysis to the independent agreement between the debtor and spouse.2 9" The analysis did not extend
nondischargeability to the underlying debt itself, which is the obligation
between the debtor and the third party creditor. Such an extension
seems warranted if the debtor's continued payment is necessary to assure the dependents an uninterrupted flow of support. For example, if
the creditor's successful collection from the spouse is likely, the family
may lack necessary funds while pursuing indemnification. On the other
hand, nondischarge of the underlying debt could injure the dependents
if, for instance, the creditor were to seek recourse against secured property possessed by the spouse or if the debtor were to cease or reduce
direct support payments to the dependents in order to satisfy other
creditors. In most cases, continuing the obligation on the hold harmless
agreement alone will adequately protect the spouse, and the detriment
of denying the debtor relief from his contractual debts merely because
of his divorce may outweigh any benefit obtained by nondischarge of
the underlying debt.
The unanimity among the courts with respect to express hold
harmless agreements ends when debt assumptions fail to provide such a
clause.24 0 While many cases have held simply that an assumption itself
implies an agreement to indemnify the former spouse for liability,241 a

number of courts have refused to extend the exception further and have
granted discharge in the absence of an express hold harmless provision,
regardless of the effect on the dependents.4 2 The requirement by some
agreement is in payment of alimony, maintenance, or support of the spouse, as determined
under bankruptcy law considerations that are similar to considerations of whether a particular agreement to pay money to a spouse is actually alimony or a property settlement.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 364, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5963, 6320; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5787, 5865.
238. See, e.g., In re Petoske, 16 Bankr. 412 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).
239. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1107. The distinction, as a practical matter, may be inconsequential. If the court discharged only the debtor's liability to the creditor, the creditor would not be
permitted to seek recourse from the debtor himself, but could proceed against the spouse, since the
debtor's discharge would not affect her coliability. If the spouse were required to pay the creditor,
she then could proceed against the debtor on his undischarged hold harmless agreement. The
debtor would risk both payment of the underlying debt and the additional costs incurred by the
creditor's debt collection efforts. Thus, the debtor may find it advantageous to pay the creditor
directly, despite discharge of the debt.
240. Calhoun itself implicitly makes this distinction. See id.
241. See, e.g., In re Lewis, 39 Bankr. 842 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Jensen, 17 Bankr.
537 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982).
242. See, e.g., In re Lineberry, 9 Bankr. 700 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981) (language of provision
in which husband agreed to pay directly to third parties all indebtedness incurred during marriage
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courts of an express indemnification clause takes too narrow a view of
the exception and exalts form over substance, which undercuts the policy of assuring support for the debtor's dependents. The courts should
limit the inquiry to ascertaining the effect of discharge on the dependents' ability to support themselves.
c. Divorce Expenses
A court order or separation agreement frequently obligates a divorcing person to pay a dependent spouse's divorce-related expenses. 243
Typically, when the question of dischargeability arises regarding obligations to pay attorney's fees, courts have continued their pre-Code tendency to refuse discharge.2 44 The usual rationale is that most states
authorize attorney's fees under the same circumstances as direct alimony and apply the same criteria to either award.24 5 Since courts award
attorney's fees because of the spouse's need, they consider these fees
sufficiently related to support to escape discharge. Similarly, courts
have found attorney's fees for drafting documents in predivorce support
actions, for post-divorce enforcement of decrees, or for defending modification actions to be nondischargeable. 4 6
When the spouse is jointly liable for payment of attorney's fees,
courts should apply the rationale employed in assumption cases. Absent
the debtor's continued responsibility for the debt, creditors would hold
the spouse solely liable, which reduces her independent means of support. In the absence of coliability, nondischarge of attorney's fees is
harder to justify. Courts sometimes reason that if the debt goes unpaid,
the former spouse may have difficulty obtaining future legal services to
bring or defend actions relating to the original divorce. Thus, payment
is necessary for continued support and therefore should not be discharged.247 Some courts have justified nondischarge of attorney's fees
on the grounds that attorneys may become reluctant to represent dependent spouses because of the risk of nonpayment due to potential
discharge of the debt in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding. '4 These
not truly a hold harmless agreement).
243. Expenses incurred in other type of family-related litigation, such as paternity actions,
frequently raise the same issues.
244. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
245. See, e.g., In re Catlow, 663 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1981); In re Spong, 661 F.2d 6 (2d Cir.
1981); In re Bodrey, 31 Bankr. 589 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983).
246. In re Gwinn, 20 Bankr. 233 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982) (post-divorce domestic relations litigation); In re Catlow, 663 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1981) (post-divorce custody proceeding).
247. See In re Steingesser, 602 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Romeo, 16 Bankr. 531 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1981); In re Bishop, 13 Bankr. 304 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Lang, 11 Bankr. 428
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981).
248. See In re Dupont, 19 Bankr. 605 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982); Richards v. Loncar, 14 Bankr.
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courts focus more on the function of attorney's fees in general than on
the circumstances of an individual case.24 9 Either analysis entails consideration of the effect of discharge on the spouse's independent means
of support, although in many cases the effect is merely presumed. 50
Somewhat ironically, many of the same courts that liberally refuse
discharge of attorney's fees take a much narrower view of other divorcerelated debts. For example, bankruptcy courts have allowed discharge
of psychologist's fees incurred in custody hearings and fees of accountants hired to evaluate spousal assets. 5 ' Such cases have justified discharge by classifying the debt as one owed to a party other than a
dependent. More commonly, and more appropriately, however, courts
will consider the substance of a debt and its relationship to support
without regard to the identity of the payee.2 52
Furthermore, as the court noted in In re Holt,253 nothing in section
523(a)(5) or elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code requires a debt to be
payable directly to a dependent. 54 The Code itself defines "debt" as a
"liability on a claim. '255 "Claim," in turn, includes not only a right to
payment, but also a "right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not
such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured. ' 25 The Code does not require that a payment must be made
257
directly to a dependent in order to constitute a debt.
The courts' discharge of debts based on the identity of the payee
thwarts the purpose of the support exception when support capability
is thereby affected. If the recipient's identity is critical to discharge,
276, 278 n.2 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981).
249. The Spong court avoided discharge of attorney's fees by viewing an agreement to pay
attorney's fees as a third-party beneficiary contract. Spong, 661 F.2d at 10-11.
250. See In re Shenewolf, 27 Bankr. 187, 188 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1982); In re Harrod, 16
Bankr. 711, 714 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982); In re Demkow, 8 Bankr. 554, 555 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1981); In re Wells, 8 Bankr. 189, 192 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981) (award of attorney's fees in Illinois
divorce generally in nature of alimony); In re Knabe, 8 Bankr. 53, 56 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1980).
251. See In re Linn, 38 Bankr. 762, 763 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1984) (psychiatrist's fees dischargeable); In re Dorman, 3 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 497 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1981) (accountant's fee and
debt to investigators whose services established divorce action dischargeable). Similarly, a few
cases have refused to classify as nondischargeable medical expenses associated with the birth of a
child born out of wedlock. See, e.g., In re Brown, 43 Bankr. 613, 615-16 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984).
252. See In re Bedingfield, 42 Bankr. 641, 645 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1983); In re Holt, 40 Bankr.
1009, 1011-12 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1984); Richards v. Loncar, 14 Bankr. 276, 277-78 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1981).
253. 40 Bankr. 1009 (Bankr. S.D. Ca. 1984).
254. Id. at 1012-13 & nn.2, 3.
255. 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) (1982).
256. Id. § 101(4).
257. See Holt, 40 Bankr. at 1011.
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results may turn on the drafting of the creating document, rather than
the substance of the debt.2 5 To avoid elevating form over substance,
bankruptcy courts should scrutinize initially the function of each debt.
B. The Role of State Law
Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 Congress intended
courts to apply federal law, not state law, in analyzing the nature of a
support-related debt for dischargeability purposes.25 9 Disagreement
continues, however, as to the appropriate role of state law in formulating that federal law. Because the concept of support is a creature of
state law, no federal law of support, nor of domestic relations in general, exists. 260 Although the federal courts have agreed that state law
should be used to guide the bankruptcy courts in the creation of the
appropriate federal standard,2 61 the extent of that guidance remains
unclear.
In enacting the current Bankruptcy Code, Congress expressly rejected the state-law approach developed under the former Bankruptcy
Act,2 82 by which courts generally categorized divorce-related debts by
reference to the law of the state in which the obligation arose.26 3 The
committee reports stated: "What constitutes alimony, maintenance, or
support, will be determined under the bankruptcy laws, not State law.
Thus, cases such as In re Waller . . .are overruled, and the result in
'
cases such as Fife v. Fife . . .is followed."264
Congress clearly intended
258. Richards, 14 Bankr. at 278.
259. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 364, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6320; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5865.
260. For discussion of the "domestic relations exception" to federal jurisdiction, see supra
note 30.
261. See, e.g., In re Spong, 661 F.2d 6, 8-9 (2d Cir. 1981); In re King, 15 Bankr. 127, 129
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1981); In re French, 9 Bankr. 464, 467 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981); In re Allen, 4
Bankr. 617, 619-20 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980).
262. Bankruptcy Act ch. 487, 32 Stat. 797 (1903).
263. See supra text accompanying notes 141-44.
264. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 364, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6320; S.REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5865. In Waller, 494 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1974), the court held that the law of
the state in which the debt arose must determine what constitutes alimony, maintenance, or support. The reference to Fife v. Fife, 1 Utah 2d 281, 265 P.2d 642 (1954), in the congressional reports
was unfortunate, as Fife did not suggest, even tangentially, bankruptcy law as the source for classification purposes. Fife, a Utah Supreme Court case, merely held that a debt arising from an annulment action had been discharged in bankruptcy. Because of the annulment, the plaintiff was not a
"former spouse," and the award could not escape discharge because alimony generally is not available in an annulment action. Id. at 282, 265 P.2d at 643. Although Fife may stand for the proposition that state law should determine the relationship of the parties in order to determine whether
a duty of support exists, the reference in the congressional reports must be interpreted solely in
terms of the result of the case.
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that, for bankruptcy purposes, courts should not categorize divorcerelated debts by applying the law of a specific state. 6 Unfortunately,
that was about all Congress made clear.
The bankruptcy court in In re Warner2 66 attempted to delineate
the proper role of state law by recognizing that, although federal law
must determine dischargeability, the underlying relationship that creates an obligation of support is a state-law question. 7 Based on that
principle, the Warner court set out a two-step test: first, by applying
the law of the state in which the obligation arose, the court should determine whether the debtor had a duty of support;26 8 second, once a
duty is established, the court should apply federal law to determine
whether a particular debt falls within that state-law duty.2 69 In other
words, according to the Warner court, the federal test is to determine
whether a debt was created to discharge a particular state-law duty of
support.
Although the Warner test enjoyed some initial acceptance, 7 ' later
cases rejected it as overemphasizing state law and approximating the
Waller approach that was expressly repudiated by Congress. 27 2 In In re
Williams 27 3 the Eighth Circuit held that a debt to pay attorney's fees
could constitute support even though the state in which the debt arose
did not view it as such.27 4 Similarly, in Boyle v. Donovan2 75 the Eighth
Circuit again held that the parties' intention that an agreement to pay
post-majority child support and educational expenses should function
as support controlled classification of the debts even though the debtor
had no duty to support his adult children under state law. 7 6 Under
265. In Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 136 (1979), the United States Supreme Court also
declared that federal law must determine discharge in bankruptcy. While Brown involved the issue
of discharge under §§ 17(a)(2) and (4) of the former Bankruptcy Act, the courts later interpreted
the case to apply in principle to dischargeability under § 523(a)(5) as well. See In re Warner, 5
Bankr. 434, 439 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980).
266. 5 Bankr. 434 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980).
267. Id. at 439.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 441-42.
271. See, e.g., In re Tillett, 22 Bankr. 907, 910 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1982); In re Miller, 17
Bankr. 717, 720 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982); cf. In re Lang, 11 Bankr. 428 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981)
(state law to be disregarded only when state law applies "support" so broadly as to encompass
property settlement).
272. See In re Yeates, 44 Bankr. 575, 578 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984), aff'd, 807 F.2d 874 (10th
Cir. 1986) (criticizing Warner as impermissibly establishing a different standard in each state and
suggesting that the two-step test realistically "collapses down to a simple one-part test based on

state law").
273.
274.

703 F.2d 1055 (8th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1057.

275. 724 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1984).
276. Accord In re Harrell, 754 F.2d 902 (11th Cir. 1985); Shaver v. Shaver, 736 F.2d 1314
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these later cases, the federal concept of support may be broader than
that of any individual state. While state law will control whether the
relationship of the parties is sufficient to establish a duty of support,
federal law should determine whether a particular obligation fulfills
that duty.
In re Spong,27 7 decided by the Second Circuit in 1981, was the first
appellate case to suggest directly that state-law support principles in
general, rather than the law of the state in which the obligation arose,
should form the basis of the federal definition of support for bankruptcy purposes. The Spong court concluded that because federal
courts do not have jurisdiction to grant divorces or award support,
"Congress could not have intended that federal courts were to formulate the bankruptcy law of alimony and support in a vacuum, precluded
from all reference to the reasoning of the well-established law of the
States. '278 The Spong court treated attorney's fees as support because a
dependent spouse may otherwise lack the ability to sue or defend a divorce action; thus, such fees may be legal necessaries.27 9 Spong thus relied on general state-law support principles, rather than the law of a
specific state, to arrive at its formulation of the federal standard of
support.
Unfortunately, the cases purporting to follow Spong largely overlooked or misconstrued this aspect of the case. 28 0 For example, in In re
Knight 281 the District Court of North Carolina, while professing to
adopt Spong, directly applied the North Carolina alimony criteria as
"guidance" in determining the parties' intent in the husband's agreement to pay attorney's fees.28 2 Other courts recognized that specific
(9th Cir. 1984). Somewhat inconsistently, Boyle implied that form might prevail over substance if
the parties followed the appropriate state-law formula. The court suggested that had the parties
intended to effect a property settlement, they could have structured their agreement accordingly
under an Arkansas statute, ARK.STAT. ANN. § 34-1214(A)(1) (Supp. 1985), that authorizes property
division only at the time the divorce decree is entered. 724 F.2d at 683.
277. 661 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981).
278. Id. at 9.
279. Id.
280. The dissent in Spong apparently misconstrued the basis of the majority's opinion, when
it criticized as impermissible the majority's reliance on state-law principles, declaring that:
Bankruptcy law is uniform, state law is diverse. When Congress directs us to determine a
matter under bankruptcy law, recourse to state law seems inappropriate. It is also an abdication of responsibility. On the majority's reasoning, divorce counsel may collect his fee from
the debtor as 'alimony' even where the client spouse has been awarded no alimony at all.
Id. at 11-12 (Lumbard, J., dissenting). Not only did the dissent misread the majority opinion as
relying on state law, rather than the reasoning behind state-law decisions, as the majority clearly
stated, see id. at 9 (majority opinion), but the dissent also contradicted itself by implying that only
court-awarded alimony should be nondischargeable. See id. at 11 (Lombard, J., dissenting).
281. 29 Bankr. 748 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1983).
282. The court held that North Carolina case law required application of the test for alimony
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state law did not control classification to the extent that a state court's
label of a debt would be determinative. 3 Some courts, however, merely
concluded that the federal law and the law of a particular state were
identical and applied the latter without further analysis.

284

Some courts

considered as relevant, but not determinative, the amount of support
the state court would have granted had it been required to address the
question,285 while others looked to the specific criteria used to award
support in the state in which the debt was created.288
Faced with such divergent standards, the Calhoun court resolved
the issue by expressly rejecting the relevance of an individual state's
law. 87 The Sixth Circuit in Calhoun concluded that the federal law of
support for bankruptcy purposes should be based on factors "most
often considered relevant by state courts generally in determining
whether to grant support without reference to any particular state's
law. 288 The Calhoun approach resolves the controversy in a manner
consistent with congressional intent.
Other courts have adopted the Calhoun approach concerning the
role of state law in the formulation of a federal standard of support. For
example, in In re Harrell 2s9 the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit arrived at a similar conclusion by pronouncing that section
523(a)(5) did not require a particular state-law duty of support. The
court reasoned that, although Congress might have referred to dischargeability in terms of state law, it chose instead to describe a nondischargeable obligation as one in the "nature" of support. The Harrell
court stated that "in using this general and abstract word, Congress did
not intend bankruptcy courts to be bound by particular state law
rules.

2 90

Thus, the court decided that the debtor's voluntary agreement

to pay post-majority child support and his sons' college expenses constituted nondischargeable support payments.
Similarly, the court in In re Yeates 291 adopted the Calhoun appendente lite in awarding attorney's fees; thus, regardless of whether the parties had designated
the attorney's fees as alimony, the court would regard the fees as such if it found the spouse to
have insufficient means to subsist during the suit and to defray the cost of litigation. Id. at 752.
283. See In re Williams, 703 F.2d 1055, 1057 (8th Cir. 1983).
284. See, e.g., Knight, 29 Bankr. at 752; In re Sledge, 47 Bankr. 349, 353 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1981).
285. See In re French, 9 Bankr. 464, 468 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981); In re Williams, 3 Bankr.
401, 403 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
286. See In re Crist, 632 F.2d 1226, 1229 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 986 (1981),
454 U.S. 819 (1981); In re Frey, 13 Bankr. 12, 14 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1981).
287. See supra text accompanying notes 201-02.
288. In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103, 1108 (6th Cir. 1983).
289. 754 F.2d 902 (11th Cir. 1985).
290. Id. at 904.
291. 44 Bankr. 575 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984), aff'd, 807 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1986).
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proach and agreed that a uniform federal standard cannot be developed
unless courts reject reliance on specific state law; otherwise, according
to the court, a different test would necessarily apply in each state and
would depend on the "relative strictness or leniency of the state's divorce laws.

'2 2

The Yeates court noted that, although the application of

a federal law based on general support principles would involve many of
the same factors and considerations as the state law determination, the
focus of the bankruptcy court is different and the weight accorded the
factors will vary.293 While a state court decides whether a legal obligation exists, the bankruptcy court is faced with an existing obligation
and the problem of classifying that obligation as support or property
settlement. 94
Thus, application of general support principles as opposed to specific state law is the emerging trend. While this approach generally has
not been disputed,295 some lower courts continue to overlook its significance by failing to recognize the distinction between general support
principles and the specific state law of support. 29 6 The approach applying general support principles is not only correct in policy terms, but is
consistent with other areas of bankruptcy law as well. 97 The task of
isolating and weighing the appropriate factors relevant to the federal
test is narrowed when the courts uniformly recognize that general, not
specific, state law should apply. The remaining problem, then, is the
isolation of those relevant general state-law factors in order that courts
292. Id. at 578.
293. Id. at 579.
294. Id.; see In re Moses, 34 Bankr. 378 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1983) (debt constitutes support
under federal law despite fact that Texas state law does not allow alimony). But see In re Comer,
723 F.2d 737, 739-40 (9th Cir. 1984) (res judicata bars court from looking behind state court default judgment); Goss v. Goss, 722 F.2d 599, 604 (10th Cir. 1983) (collateral estoppel prevents
redetermination of state court decision as to nature of debt).
295.
See also White, supra note 11, at 29-31 (discussing lack of uniformity regarding reliance placed on state law). But see In re Comer, 723 F.2d 737, 739-40 (9th Cir. 1984) (res judicata
bars court from looking behind state court default judgment); Goss v. Goss, 722 F.2d 599, 604
(10th Cir. 1983) (collateral estoppel will prevent redetermination of a state court decision as to the
nature of a debt).
296. See, e.g., In re Bedingfield, 42 Bankr. 641, 646 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1983). Bedingfield cited
Calhoun with approval and noted that bankruptcy courts are not bound to accept state-law characterizations any more than they must accept the language of the decree itself. The Bedingfield
court went on, however, to state that most bankruptcy courts consider such factors as "applicable
state law" in determining the nature of a debt. Id. at 646 & n.1 (citing In re Crist, 632 F.2d 1226,
1229 (5th Cir. 1980) (decided under the Bankruptcy Act), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 986 (1981), 454
U.S. 819 (1981)).
297. While the Bankruptcy Code directs that the law of a specific state should be applied in
determining some bankruptcy issues, see, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (exemptions), Id. § 502 (allowance of claims or interests), when no such direction applies and no specific
federal law exists, general state law principles should be applied in order to achieve national uniformity. See Note, Indiana Divorce Law, supra note 14, at 391-94 (1979).
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can apply them in a uniform manner.
C. Analysis of Individual Debts
Once courts acknowledge both that the payee's identity does not
determine whether a debt is in the nature of support and that the applicable federal law must be based on general state-law principles
rather than the law of a particular state, the final issue is the proper
analysis of a specific debt to identify the attributes of support. The
analysis must focus on the underlying family law concept of support as
a means of fulfilling a dependent's actual needs as determined by the
accustomed standard of living. Since support is based on relative need,
every case will require an individualized investigation. Courts can simplify the inquiry, however, by adopting a uniform general approach or
test that delineates the factors relevant to categorization of a specific
debt. Thus, the final issue has two related but distinct components: the
application of the proper analytical approach and the identification of
the appropriate factors to apply in that approach.
The Calhoun case represents a significant step towards developing
the proper approach to categorizing a specific debt. Calhoun's threestep test attempts to encompass both components of this final issue. To
achieve the desired comprehensive and consistent result, as well as to
facilitate divorce planning, however, the Calhoun approach must be
modified and clarified to address the dual nature of the inquiry and to
focus more directly on the underlying contemporary nature of support.
1. The General Test
Prior to Calhoun, courts generally analyzed debts under section
523(a)(5) by applying various and often imprecise versions of an "intent" test developed under the former bankruptcy law. 9 8 In an attempt
to clarify the appropriate standard, the Calhoun court proposed a
three-step test based on separate inquiries into the following: the intent
of the court or the parties creating the obligation; the actual effect of
the liability in providing for the necessary support of the debtor's dependents; and the reasonableness of the debt, both at the time of its
creation and at the time of the bankruptcy action. 9
While the first two prongs of the test, intent and effect, are similar
to earlier judicial approaches, Calhoun's requirement of separate findings of both an intention that the debt constitute support and an actual
effect of the debt in functioning as support is questionable. Imposing an
intent test as the first step gives rise to the ambiguities and circular
298.
299.

See supra text accompanying notes 148-53.
In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983).
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reasoning that the exclusive use of such a test promoted in the past."o
In most cases, courts cannot determine intent without analyzing the
function of the debt. Apparently, the Calhoun court created the initial
step to prevent overly liberal interpretation of the second step, since, as
the court noted, every assumption of debt may function as support to
some extent.301 The addition of an intent test could act as a check to
assure that not every divorce-related debt avoids discharge in
bankruptcy.
This check seems unnecessary, however, given the Calhoun court's
definition of support in terms of need-the amount necessary to fulfill
the dependents' actual living requirements-which is consistent with
general state-law principles of support. Since only actual need qualifies
a debt for categorization as support under the effect test, a built-in
check exists that allows the discharge of excessive obligations. Calhoun's third step, which focuses the inquiry into the reasonableness of
the debt, further balances the impact of the effect test by assuring that
need is measured on a relative basis that considers the debtor's ability
to pay, which again is consistent with general state-law principles.
Perhaps Calhoun's directive to establish intent can be interpreted
conversely: if the parties or the court intended the debt to be part of a
property distribution, which is a division of ownership interests, then
the debt is dischargeable regardless of its effect. In other words, a debt
arising from a mere division of property rights is dischargeable and can
never be classified as support in the federal bankruptcy sense. Tilley v.
Jessee3 0 2 illustrates the danger of such an approach.

In Tilley the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded
that the husband's agreement to pay a lump sum in installments, secured by life insurance, in exchange for the wife's interest in real estate
was dischargeable. The wife demonstrated both a need for the payment
and her own intention that the agreement was to provide for her support.3 03 Although the husband conceded that the payment actually was

used for the wife's support, he argued that his intention was merely to
gain control of the property and that he had treated his payments as
nondeductible for tax purposes. The Fourth Circuit held that the wife
had failed to carry the burden of proving mutual intent and permitted
discharge of the debt.3 04 Although the Tilley court did not refer to Calhoun, the case exemplifies the consequence of placing excessive impor300. See supra text accompanying notes 180-86.
301. 715 F.2d at 1108.
302. 789 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1986).
303. The wife was in poor health and unable to support herself or retain her standing in the
community without the husband's payment of $2000 per month. Id. at 1076.
304. Id. at 1078.
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tance on an intent test.
If Calhoun's intent test requires a mutual, subjective intention that
the obligation constitute support, the test must be erroneous. Because
property division today has replaced traditional post-marital support to
a significant extent, the support aspects of such a property division
should be nondischargeable insofar as they do not exceed actual need.
If a property division were ordered or agreed to as a substitute for continued support payments, a court's denial of spousal rights otherwise
enforceable, simply because of the form selected, would be inequitable.
Calhoun's intent test may be superfluous, because in most cases
intent is unclear and because courts determine intent by applying the
same factors used to demonstrate need. In other words, if a debt were
to have the effect of providing support under the effect test, undoubtedly the parties would have intended the debt as support unless an unambiguous intent to the contrary was apparent. Application of an initial
intent test is unnecessarily dangerous, moreover, because courts may
attribute too much import to the language of the document and the
placement of its terms. Therefore, the first two steps of Calhoun should
be compressed into a single test based on need as evidenced by the
function of the obligation. Although speaking in terms of intent, the
court in In re Yeates 30 5 effectively applied such a test and concluded
that generally the determinative criterion should be whether the spouse
is able to provide for her own basic necessities. Thus, a debt should not
be discharged if discharge would leave the spouse without adequate
means to meet those needs. The fresh start policy of bankruptcy should
override the statutory exception if the spouse is capable of self-support.
When courts add the third step-reasonableness of the debt-to
the formula, the test becomes one of determining relative, rather than
absolute, need, which is the same criterion traditionally and currently
relied upon by most state courts in ordering support. The relative need
standard seems best to approximate the intent of Congress in enacting
the exception for debts "actually in the nature" of support, while at the
same time rejecting proposals to except from discharge all divorcerelated debts, especially those arising from property divisions.2° Congress must have meant for the bankruptcy courts to analyze the actual
function of divorce-related debts. For a debt to function as support, the
debt must fulfill a need on the part of the dependent. Although needs
include goods and services necessary for mere survival, needs must be,
and have traditionally been, determined relative to the standard of liv305. 44 Bankr. 575 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984), afld, 807 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1986).
306. See 3 Bankruptcy Act Revision: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1287-88 (1976).
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ing previously enjoyed by the parties as balanced against the abilities of
the parties to provide for those needs. The ability to provide necessarily
relates to the reasonableness of the debt. Thus the "actual nature" of a
debt encompasses its reasonableness in terms of ability to pay as well as
the function of the debt in any absolute sense.
The Calhoun test to determine the reasonableness of a debt consists of two separate inquiries: determining the reasonableness of the
debt in light of the debtor's ability to pay at the time of divorce, and
reevaluating the reasonableness of the debt at the time of bankruptcy.
While courts could easily incorporate the first inquiry into a single test
based on function, courts have severely criticized the second inquiry-reevaluating the reasonableness of the debt at bankruptcy-as
an impermissible attempt to modify a state court award outside the ju0 8 the Eleventh
risdiction of the bankruptcy court.3 07 In In re Harrell"
Circuit rejected this aspect of Calhoun by interpreting the statutory
language to require "bankruptcy courts to determine nothing more than
whether the support label accurately reflects that the obligation at issue
is 'actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support,'" a simple inquiry that does not involve a determination of precise financial
circumstances or levels of need.3 09 According to the Harrell court, an
ongoing assessment of need due to changing circumstances is strictly a
function of the state courts.3 10 The Harrell approach begs the question
and offers no guidance as to how to discern the "nature" of support
obligations.
The court in In re Yeates31 also criticized the Calhoun inquiry
into the reasonableness of the debt at the time of bankruptcy. The
Yeates court rejected the notion that bankruptcy judges should balance
policy considerations by concluding that Congress already had performed that function. The court further disapproved consideration of
the debtor's current financial condition, because "[c]ertainly Congress
was aware that a debtor in bankruptcy will have suffered a constantly
worsening financial condition. ' 31 2 However, the Yeates court regarded
the spouse's present financial condition as relevant by reasoning that if
the payment is no longer necessary for support, the "change in the underlying nature of the payment will make it superfluous, and
307. In re Harrell, 754 F.2d 902 (11th Cir. 1985); In re Yeates, 44 Bankr. 575 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1984), aff'd, 807 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1986).
308. 754 F.2d 902 (11th Cir. 1985).
309. Id. at 906.
310. Id. at 907.
311. 44 Bankr. 575 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984), a/I'd, 807 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1986).
312. Id. at 580.
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dischargeable.

3'

13

Yeates thus refined and compressed Calhoun's reasonableness test
to require a determination of the following: first, whether the payment
was meant to enable the spouse to meet the basic necessities of life;
and, second, whether the payment remained necessary at the time the
debtor filed his bankruptcy petition. In Yeates, because the wife was in
a poor financial position both at the time of the divorce and the time
the debtor filed bankruptcy, the court found that the loan was necessary to preserve her ability to keep her home. The wife's receipt of assistance from her parents did not relieve the debtor of his duty of
support; nor did the possibility that the wife could find cheaper housing
prevent the debt from relating to an essential need. Consistent with the
idea of need as a relative concept, the Yeates court noted that the
couple's lifestyle during their marriage may be relevant in determining
the necessary level of support. 1
Although the effect of reevaluation of a debt in light of present
circumstances may be to reduce the amount of a debt that originally
constituted support, the Calhoun approach may be more in accord with
15
the Code's exception for a debt that "is" in the nature of support.

The question is perhaps more definitional than jurisdictional: Calhoun
would allow discharge of debts or portions thereof that, at the time of
bankruptcy, do not currently provide actual support to dependents.
The limited inquiry into reasonableness of the debt is tempered by the
court's caution that only an obligation, otherwise characterized as support, which is "manifestly unreasonable," to the extent it "substantially
exceed[s] a spouse's present and foreseeable ability to pay," should be
reduced in amount.1 6 Furthermore, when the debtor's present circumstances have changed, Calhoun permits reduction of a debt only when
7
31
continuation of the obligation would be inequitable.

A single integrated function test based on generally accepted statelaw concepts of support focuses on the true effect of an individual debt.
Calhoun's three-part test should be consolidated into one test that requires analysis of all three steps to assure that all relevant aspects of
the inquiry are properly addressed.3

18

The courts, however, must be

conscious of the interrelationship between intent and effect in order to
313. Id.
314. Id. at 581 n.5.
315. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(B) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
316. In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103, 1110 (6th Cir. 1983).
317. Id. at 1110 n.11.
318. Courts approving Calhoun's three-step test frequently have failed to delineate those
steps in applying the test. See, e.g., In re Troup, 730 F.2d 464 (6th Cir. 1984) (applied only first
step); In re Bedingfield, 42 Bankr. 641 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1983) (same).
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avoid excessive emphasis on the relevance of intent in ambiguous cases.
While the Calhoun court expressly limited application of its analysis to assumptions of indebtedness, several courts have found the Calhoun test equally applicable to any case in which the nature of a debt is
in question.3 19 This extension is warranted because Calhoun provides a
standard consistent with the language of section 523(a)(5) and congressional intent to except from discharge only those debts that are in the
nature of support. Once a court has defined the nature of nondischargeable debts in terms of their function of satisfying relative need, the
court can isolate the factors that indicate support in order to characterize an individual debt.
2.

Relevant Factors

Calhoun properly mandates that bankruptcy courts should determine the nature of a debt, within its analytical framework, by applying
factors typically used by state courts in general. The final inquiry is
designed to isolate those factors that are relevant to determining when
a debt functions as support as defined by contemporary general state
law. While the Calhoun court cited examples of factors commonly considered relevant3 20 and noted that their application led to "[flairly divergent dispositions, '32 1 the court unfortunately did not go far enough
in delineating the appropriateness of specific factors. As a result, bankruptcy courts remain uncertain as to how to categorize an individual
debt, even when ostensibly relying on the Calhoun approach. Although
Calhoun failed to analyze the significance of individual factors or to
reject completely application of certain other factors, courts must attempt this task in order to achieve uniformity of result.
The bankruptcy courts, as well as the state courts, frequently place
considerable significance on the structure and language of the parties'
separation agreement or the court's order of support.3 22 The indefiniteness of obligations, the existence and form of other payments, and the
labeling of debts frequently remain critical. Certainly, such factors may
tend to demonstrate an affirmative intention to provide a continuing
source of necessary funds; courts, however, should not consider their
absence to be indicative of the converse because many, if not most, obli319. See, e.g., In re Singer, 787 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Bedingfield, 42 Bankr. 641,
646 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1983).
320. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1108.
321. Id.
322. See, e.g., In re Gebhardt, 53 Bankr. 113 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1985) (bankruptcy court
"cannot ignore the plain language of the separation agreement" and thus should only ascertain
function of debt when decree ambiguous); In re Hillius Farms, 38 Bankr. 334 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1984)
(must ignore parties' circumstances if decree is unambiguous).
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gations that function as support today are structured in non-traditional
3 23
forms.
In re Bedingfield3 24 is a case in point. Although the Bedingfield
court relied heavily on Calhoun and emphasized the functional importance of the debt, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court's discharge
of the debtor's assumption of first and second mortgage payments. Despite the parties' denomination of part of the award as "additional alimony, 3 25 the court concluded that the agreement was dischargeable as
part of a property division. In reaching its conclusion, the Bedingfield
court noted that the debtor was to continue payments beyond the wife's
remarriage or death and that the wife and children did not live in the
home, but rented it to a third party while the wife attended law school
in another city. Furthermore, the court found the debtor's assumption
of the wife's automobile loan and his agreement to pay her law school
expenses insufficiently related to support to avoid discharge.
By failing to inquire whether the payment of these debts was necessary for the wife to maintain her actual living expenses while pursuing a higher education and new career, the Bedingfield decision has the
potential to subject to discharge any award of rehabilitative alimony.3 26
No dependent spouse will be assured of maintaining an adequate standard of living while attempting to become self-supporting if the courts
fail to recognize that rehabilitative alimony lacks the traditional features of permanent alimony but fulfills the same purpose of providing
for relative necessaries during the transitional period from dependency
to self-support. To conclude that rehabilitative alimony awards, regardless of the label of the obligation, are not in the nature of support contravenes the prevailing state law preference for awarding support on a
short-term basis.3 27 Courts should limit the significance placed on the
language or structure of an obligation to the first inquiry, which focuses
on determining the parties' intentions; courts should not use language
or structure to defeat an obligation that otherwise functions as support.
The courts' primary inquiry should focus on the parties' existent
circumstances, in terms of the actual dollars necessary for the dependents to maintain a reasonable standard of living, with due regard to
the dependents' predivorce lifestyle and the debtor's ability to subsidize
that standard of living when the dependents are unable to maintain it
on their own. In this regard, the following factors bear directly on de323. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
324. 42 Bankr. 641 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1983).
325. Id. at 648. The agreement regarding the second mortgage was located in a provision
transferring title to the home to the wife. Id. at 649.
326. Cf. discussion of Tilley v. Jessee, supra notes 299-301 and accompanying text.
327. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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termining the needs and abilities of the respective parties: mental,
physical, and emotional health; age; work skills; educational background and opportunities to enhance earning potentials; and the extent
of individual assets. Likewise, courts should consider the presence of
minor children, their unique needs, and the custodial and visitational
arrangements made regarding them. The length of the parties' marriage
may be relevant in determining the standard of living to which all the
parties were accustomed, and thus their relative needs.
In In re Singer32 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit applied such factors 29 to conclude that a debtor's agreement to pay his

former wife 800 dollars per month for five years, then 400 dollars per
month for five additional years, was nondischargeable, despite the
agreement's denomination of the payments as a release of property
rights. 330 The court distinguished a "property settlement in connection
with alimony, maintenance, or support" from one that is "strictly a
property settlement," and held that the former is sufficiently in the na332
ture of support to escape discharge. 3 ' Similarly, in Shaver v. Shaver
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that the absence of
express provisions for spousal support in a settlement agreement, in
conjunction with circumstances indicating a need for support, may lead
to the conclusion that the parties may actually have intended a nominal
property settlement to constitute support. Both the Singer and Shaver
decisions accommodate non-traditional forms of support by focusing on
the effect of the payment on the spouse's ability to maintain a comparable standard of living, at least on a temporary basis.
While the above-mentioned factors are commonly considered relevant in analyzing the nature of a debt, 3 ' few courts have attempted to
confine the inquiry by eliminating certain other factors as unrelated to
categorization of a debt as support. Since courts should define support
in terms of its overall function of providing the relative necessaries of
the particular dependents, some facts are simply irrelevant to the
inquiry.
One such factor is marital fault. Although blame for the breakdown
328.

787 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1986).

329. Relevant factors considered by the Singer court included the wife's advanced age, her
lack of employment during the marriage, and the husband's provision of a $200 week support
allowance to the wife during the marriage after he had moved from the home. Id. at 1035.
330. The wife had contributed the proceeds from the sale of her home from a prior marriage
to the purchase of the couple's home, an additional fact which would support a finding that the
payments were in the nature of a property division. Id. at 1033.
331. Id. at 1034.
332. 736 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1984).
333. See, e.g., In re Singer, 787 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Bedingfield, 42 Bankr. 641
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1983); Hoover v. Hoover, 38 Bankr. 325 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983).
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of the marriage remains relevant in some states in awarding alimony, its
importance has declined significantly.3 3 Few types of traditionally recognized forms of marital fault, such as adultery or cruelty, have any
relationship to the parties' economic circumstances, and thus should
not enter into a classification inquiry at the bankruptcy level.3 3 5 While
economic types of fault, such as dissipation of marital assets or failure
to provide for dependents to the best of one's capability, may influence
a support award, only their direct connection to the provision of relative necessities seems relevant in determining the nature of a payment.
Similarly, desertion, nonsupport, and alcoholism or drug addiction,
which are also commonly recognized grounds for divorce, may have an
indirect bearing on the nature of a debt if they affect the economic status of the parties. In the typical case, however, courts should regard
fault as irrelevant in classifying a debt to a spouse as they should disregard it in classifying child support, in which fault plays no role.
Likewise, in determining the nature of an obligation for dischargeability in bankruptcy, courts should not consider the underlying
purpose for which a particular debt was originally incurred. Calhoun
suggests that such an inquiry may be appropriate, however, at least
with respect to classifying hold harmless agreements. 336 Even if the parties initially incurred a debt in the acquisition of a luxury item or for
one spouse's personal benefit, the facts surrounding its original purpose
become meaningless if the current payment of that debt allows a de337
pendent to maintain the predivorce standard of living.
Courts should consider the original purpose of a debt only if it directly bears on the ability of the dependents to support themselves. For
example, the likelihood that a creditor actually would proceed against
334. See supra note 3 and accompanying test.
335. But see In re Cleveland, 7 Bankr. 927 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1981) (concluding that award was
intended as support when wife granted divorce on grounds of cruelty, under which state court
usually awarded support).
336. In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103, 1111 (6th Cir. 1983) (stating that "[t]he Bankruptcy
Court also erred by not considering each loan obligation assumed individually. Many of the factors
considered in determining dischargeability could vary depending upon the type of loan involved,
its purposes and the circumstances"); see also In re Newman, 15 Bankr. 67 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1981) (car payments assumed by husband dischargeable because car not essential to providing
transportation for children).
337. The court in In re Holt, 40 Bankr. 1009 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1984), noted:
Obviously, when a newly married couple purchases furniture on credit, dischargeability of
debt and divorce may be the farthest thing from their minds. Usually, such a debt is dischargeable. It is the legally significant event of the divorce decree or separation agreement by
which an old, dischargeable debt is transformed into a different obligation which is rendered
nondischargeable by § 523(a)(5). The old debt is not the same. When the old debt is branded
by the divorce decree, it attains a new and different status. It is then transmogrified from
dischargeable to non-dischargeable.
Id. at 1012.
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the dependent rather than against some secured property, if the obligor
spouse were discharged, could be relevant in a particular instance. For
instance, an obligation would directly relate to support if discharge of a
debt secured by an asset would likely deprive the dependent of an article of essential property, such as household furnishings or a necessary
means of transportation. In the usual case, however, courts should inquire only into the effect of discharge on the dependents' relative
means of support and not on the underlying obligation.
V.

CONCLUSION

Bankruptcy law's failure to identify clearly the type of debt that
qualifies as support for purposes of nondischargeability results largely
from the courts' neglecting to consider closely the contemporary meaning of support in the state family law context. Although the form of
support awards has changed dramatically in recent years, those awards
serve the same function as they have historically: support is meant to
fulfill the necessary living requirements of dependents. Courts cannot
identify support in the abstract, however, but must analyze it with reference to the family's accustomed standard of living. What may be essential to one family may not be critical to another. Courts, therefore,
must define support in terms of the individual family's circumstances.
The form of the support obligation does not alter its underlying
nature, whether the payment is made as traditional alimony or part of a
property division, for an indefinite period or a short term, as a liquidated amount or a series of modifiable installments. Nor does the identity of the actual recipient of the payment affect the nature of an
obligation as support: a payment made indirectly for the benefit of a
dependent can contribute to the dependent's support in just as critical
a manner as one paid directly to the dependent. Courts can define support only in terms of its actual function in a given fact situation.
In order to develop a federal law of support, as was intended by
Congress, bankruptcy courts must consider state family law principles
in general, without regard to the particular laws of an individual state.
Those general principles require consideration of factors indicating the
function of a debt in providing for the day-to-day maintenance of family members; only those factors that have a direct relationship to the
economic means of the parties are relevant. Function, the actual impact
on the dependents' means of meeting their necessary financial obligations, is the only true indicia of support. Courts must measure that
function in relative terms, as it was measured historically under the
necessaries doctrine.
The Calhoun case sets out a format, albeit somewhat flawed, for
testing individual debts for the attributes of support. By modifying the
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Calhoun approach to focus entirely on the function of an individual
debt and by clarifying the factors necessary in determining that function, bankruptcy courts will be able to apply a predictable standard for
deciding dischargeability questions. A predictable federal standard of
support will allow courts to achieve the desired uniformity that is lacking under the current approach.
By its nature, the inquiry requires a case-by-case, factual analysis.
But by adopting a standard that clearly defines the nature of support as
a concept relative to the parties' standard of living, an approach that
constitutes a revitalization of the necessaries doctrine, courts can narrow and simplify that inquiry. Revitalization of the necessaries doctrine
will result in a federal standard of support that is consistent with modern divorce law principles and will lead to the uniformity and predictability long sought under the Bankruptcy Code.

